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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this project is to lay the foundations for the launching of a
non-government organization (NGO) focused upon providing marginalized Sudanese
women and their children with means whereby to reintegrate into their communities
following long-term residence in refugee camps. The guiding premise is that the
determination of those needs must arise out of the experiences they have had in the
process of their displacement to camps, in the camps themselves, and in the communities
to which they have returned. Consequently, this study entails visits to Kakuma Refugee
Camp in Kenya and South Sudan, the prospective venues for such an NGO. Research on
the evolution of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and its mandates, as well as the historical and political evolution of Sudan,
which led to the wars displacing these women is also included. That work and that on
Kakuma Refugee Camp includes site visits, consultation of available literature and
government documents, interviews with refugees and others both in Africa and the
United States. Much information was also drawn from attendance in two sessions of the
Rift Valley Institute Courses.
The first chapter of the narrative examines the history of the evolution of the
UNHCR, its mandates and their execution in Europe after World War II, as well as the
adaptation and application of those mandates as they addressed world-wide refugee crisis
from the 1960s onward.
v

In an effort to relate the Sudanese context of current social, political, religious and
economic circumstances, the second chapter addresses the roots of the development of
the post-independence conflicts leading to the secession of South Sudan and their
aftermath.
The third chapter relates the establishment of Kakuma Refugee Camp, the
juncture of UNHCR and Government of Kenya policy, describing the physical facility
and the conditions under which refugees now live.
A proposal for the establishment of a program to help women and their host
communities in Sudan is offered in the fourth chapter. Also forwarded are two related,
alternate proposals, should conditions in South Sudan not allow engagement there.
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INTRODUCTION
In the fifty-six years since its independence, Sudan has been in an almost
perpetual state of civil conflict through which Khartoum's efforts to Arabize and Islamify
the nation's identity, as well as its population base, were expressed. Both southern Sudan
and Darfur have suffered the brunt of scorched-earth policies aimed at destroying
non-Arab and non-Muslim populations, or at very least driving such groups out of Sudan.
The process created hundreds of thousands of internally displaced populations, a large
number of which would ultimately find their way to refugee camps in the surrounding
nation-states willing to accept them. Kenya was among those nation-states. Among the
refugees, both internally and externally relocated, some of the most marginalized groups
were women who had been raped in the course of the protracted Sudanese conflict.
In 2008, when this project was in its incipient phase, when the conflict between
northern and southern Sudan was seemingly coming to an end, the author had determined
to found a developmental non-government organization to assist southern Sudanese
women in a Kenyan refugee camp, Kakuma, or alternatively in post-conflict southern
Sudan. It was of ethnically limited scope, focusing on primarily Dinka women. Sexually
violated women in that tribal group, as in others, are shunned by their communities and
therefore destitute, living on the margins of society along with their dependent children.
But two trips to Kakuma and a journey to southern Sudan yielded rather disheartening
findings concerning a possible intervention in that refugee camp, as well as more
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encouraging prospects for engagement in the post-conflict environment of South Sudan,
which became the world's newest nation-state in July, 2011. There was already a
relatively large group of marginalized women who had never left Sudan on the one hand,
or who had been repatriated on the other. And, following independence, South Sudan
will surely see an influx of such women returning from long stays at Kakuma and other
camps.
Kakuma is a camp populated by over 80,000 refugees whose services are
coordinated by a handful of U.N. employees, a few International Non-Government
Organizations (INGOs) and selected refugees. These are unequal to the task of fully
providing even basic survival needs for camp residents. Nor are they able to provide a
safe environment for their charges. Violent crimes of all sorts are part of life within its
borders, and mostly go unpunished. This is why the establishment of a Non-Government
Organization (NGO) to help women, or, for that matter, any subset of the population of
its inhabitants is unfeasible. Valentino Achak Deng, one of the "lost boys" who walked
roughly 1000 miles before arriving at Kakuma, perhaps best sums up the conditions
there:
What was life like in Kakuma? Was it life? There was a debate about this.
On the one hand, we were alive, which meant we were living a life, that
we were eating and could enjoy friendships and learning and could love.
But we were nowhere. Kakuma is nowhere. Kakuma was, we were first
told, the Kenyan word for nowhere. No matter the meaning of the word,
the place was not a place. It was a kind of purgatory.1

1

Dave Eggers, What is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng: A Novel
(New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 373.
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This is what demanded a major adjustment to the purpose of this project: that
marginalized women could only be helped in the context of a transitional or post-conflict
venue. But, yet another adjustment had to be made to the premise that any development
plan had to arise out of local needs. The reality of almost 50 years of war has
undermined the socio-economic, political and cultural foundations that had sustained
civil society in southern Sudan. They, too, would have to be rebuilt. If the end of the
project is to help women reconstruct their lives, the needs of their villages, whether male
or female, will also have to be met. Hence the title of this project.
The revised purpose of this project, then, is to lay the groundwork for the creation
of an non-government organization to help a community achieve an identified
developmental need with the indirect end of helping to reintegrate marginalized women
and their children.
Two preliminary visits to Kakuma confirmed that Kakuma was simply not the
proper venue for a program to help marginalized women reintegrate. The camp was
overpopulated with people of various ethnicities who had escaped social and political
upheavals in a number of African nation-states. None were integrated into stable
societies. All were in their own individual ways marginalized. Stateside research and
attendance at Rift Valley Institute Courses, along with contacts made on the ground in
Sudan dictated an ordered study of the factors which yielded the shortage of staff and
funding to effectively establish and administer camps such as Kakuma. Fundamentally,
the refugees were traumatized twice: once by the wars that brought them there; and again
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by the hopeless conditions that met them when they arrived at camps from which there
was only slim opportunity for relocation.2
Given that Camps like Kakuma were the end-product of the successive
development of organizations meant to assist in the relocation of refugees produced by
the ravages of World War II, the first chapter will examine the evolution of those
organizations, their missions, mandates and monetization in the context of, first,
European, and then global venues. This chapter will trace organizational transformations
as well as their application to developing global refugee crises. It will seek to illuminate
the elements of the UNHCR which, when faced with East African realities, predisposed
failure to provide adequately for refugees.
The second chapter, since southern Sudanese former refugees are the target group
in the formation of the proposed development program, will present an overview of
Sudanese History with emphasis on the period since Sudan's July 1956 independence
from Egyptian and British colonizers. It will examine the formation of the Government
of Sudan's policies and action toward its non-Arab and non-Muslim populations, which
led to sustained hostilities between northern and southern Sudan for the bulk of the
fifty-six years since independence. It will also attempt to enumerate some of the
challenges before the newly independent South Sudanese government in terms of the
implications they might have for a developmental NGO.

2

UNHCR reports that: “of the 10.5 million refugees of concern to UNHCR around the
world, only about 1 per cent are submitted by the agency for resettlement.” For details
see: UNHCR, “Resettlement,” http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html
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The third chapter will explore the circumstances surrounding the establishment
of Kakuma in the context of U.N. policy and the changing Kenyan realities into which
the camp was thrust. It will also describe the camp and the conditions under which
refugees live their lives. Its relations to the residents of the host country as well as
Sudanese influences will be discussed.
Chapter four will forward hypothetical approaches to the formation of an
organization working to ameliorate the circumstances of host communities and the
marginalized women associated with them. Six potential sites will be identified along
with the services an NGO might help establish in them. Four schools are located in
South Sudan with which such an organization might partner, and two organizations
outside the new nation-state were targeted, in the event that the government of South
Sudan cannot maintain civil order.
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CHAPTER 1
IT WORKED SO WELL IN EUROPE: BUT THIS IS AFRICA

The unfolding ravages of World War II had displaced some 40 million Europeans
by 1944, creating a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions that demanded the
urgent attention of the Allied Powers. Prior to the postwar creation of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950, the western allies
and the Soviet Union tried a variety of short lived, impermanent measures as discussed
below. The Office of the UNHCR would, however, prove to be a much more enduring
approach to protect refugees. In the context of a Europe under reconstruction, the
UNHCR’s initial objectives were limited, centering on the provision of legal protection
and resettlement opportunities for refugees. Humanitarian assistance delivered to refugee
settlements was assumed to be of short duration, in that resettlement or repatriation would
occur in a timely manner. Consequently, such aid was focused solely on basic
subsistence needs:
The history of the UNHCR is of particular wider interest because it
highlights the challenges and pitfalls faced by an organization vested with
defending a regime premised on justice, over a period in which states have
been far more concerned with order, and in which power and interests
have been the dominant influences in world politics. In other words, the
refugee regime is one in which states would almost certainly not have
agreed to at any subsequent historical juncture.3
3

Gil Loescher, Alexander Betts and James Milner, The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection
into the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2008). (Hereafter cited as: Loescher,
Betts and Milner, The United Nations, 2008 ed.), 128.
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In 1943, Allied Powers and the Soviet Union established an intergovernmental
body, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) whose
mandate was to assist in the relief of refugees and internally displaced persons along with
the rehabilitation of the war-affected areas of World War II. “Until the end of the war in
Europe in May 1945, UNRRA focused largely on repatriation.”4 By the end of its
mandate in 1947, the UNRRA had repatriated almost 75 percent of those displaced by the
war.5 Although repatriation occurred expeditiously it became increasingly controversial.
“Among those speedily repatriated during this period were some two million Soviet
citizens of whom many . . . had not wanted to return. Many of these people eventually
ended up in Stalin’s labour camps.”6 Cutts further explains:
By 1946, an acrimonious debate had arisen over whether or not UNRRA
should provide assistance to people who did not wish to be repatriated.
Eastern bloc countries asserted that assistance should be given only to

4

Mark Cutts, The State of the World's Refugees, 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian
Action (Geneva: UNHCR, 2000). (Hereafter cited as: Cutts), 14.
5

Gill Loescher, Beyond Charity-International Cooperation and the Global Refugee
Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). (Hereafter cited as: Loescher, Beyond
Charity), 48. See also: Michael Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 310: “In May and June
1945, 80,000 individuals were repatriated each day, amounting to 5.25 million displaced
persons.” See also: Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between
Sovereigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 130-131: “At the end of
September 1945 total figures included two million Soviet nationals repatriated from the
western zones of Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, 230,000 from western European
countries including France and Norway, and 200,000 Yugoslavs. Between November
1945 and July 1947, UNRRA repatriated 202,000 displaced persons from Austria,
742,000 from the western zones of Germany and 18,000 from Italy.”
6

Cutts, 14.
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displaced persons who returned home. Western bloc countries insisted
that individuals should be free to decide whether or not to return, and that
this choice should not prejudice their right to assistance. For its part, the
US government denounced UNRRA’s repatriation programmes in Eastern
bloc countries as serving only to strengthen Soviet political control over
eastern Europe.7
“Repatriation touched on the fundamental ideological conflicts dividing the East and
West.”8 “Eventually the U.S. government, which provided 70 percent of the of
UNRRA’s funding and much of its leadership, refused to extend the organization’s
mandate beyond 1947 or to grant further financial support.”9 As a result, the UNRRA
was replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO) in July 1947, “which had
as its chief function not repatriation but the resettlement of refugees and displaced
persons uprooted by World War II and its aftermath.”10
The IRO’s primary mandate was to deal with every aspect of resettlement for
those who had not yet been repatriated. It was the first international body of its kind:
Its functions were defined as encompassing repatriation, identification,
registration and classification, care and assistance, legal and political
protection, transport, resettlement and re-establishment. These multiple
functions nevertheless masked a clear shift in priorities from a policy of
repatriation, as carried out by UNRRA, to one of resettlement from
countries of asylum to third countries.11

7

Ibid., 16.

8

Loescher, Beyond Charity, 49.

9

Cutts, 16.

10

Loescher, Beyond Charity, 50.

11

Cutts, 16.

9
With the establishment of the IRO, states recognized the right of refugees
not to be repatriated against their will. The international community also
adopted, for the first time, a universal definition of refugee based on
individualized “persecution or fear of persecution” on the grounds of race,
religion, nationality, or political opinion. In so doing, Western powers
made refugee eligibility dependent upon the circumstances of the
individual rather than membership in a group, and accepted the
individual’s right to flee from political persecution. . . . Previously,
international organizations had dealt only with specific groups, and
refugee status was therefore dependent on belonging to that group, rather
than the specific experience of an individual.12
At the end of its three-year mandate in 1952, the International Refugee
Organization had assisted in the repatriation of 73,000 individuals and the resettlement of
over a million people. This left approximately 400,000 individuals across Europe still in
need of either repatriation or resettlement.13 As suggested by Gil Loescher, Alexander
Betts and James Milner:
The IRO resettled the majority of the refugee caseload it had inherited
from the UNRRA. It was able to accomplish this because many nations
saw recruiting from the displaced persons camps in Europe as one way of
addressing their domestic labor shortages following the Second World
War and the subsequent period of economic growth.14
“Discussions took place within the United Nations from 1948-1950 regarding the
termination of the IRO and creation of a new international refugee organization – [the]
UNHCR.”15 Ideological cleavages occurred primarily between the United States,

12

Loescher, Betts and Milner, The United Nations, 2008 ed., 11.

13

Cutts, 17.

14

Loescher, Betts and Milner, The United Nations, 2008 ed., 11-12.

15

Ibid., 12.
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Western European nation-states, and the Soviet Union and its Allies. The Soviet Bloc
boycotted many of the negotiations while there:
. . . were widespread divergences amongst the Western powers
themselves. The United States sought a strictly defined, temporary agency,
requiring little financing and with limited objectives, notably the
protection of the remaining IRO refugees until they were permanently
settled. . . . By contrast, Western European states, which bore the brunt of
the refugee burden, together with Pakistan and India, which were each
hosting millions of refugees following the partition of India in 1947,
favoured a strong, permanent, multipurpose refugee agency. They argued
for an independent High Commissioner with the power to raise funds and
disperse them to refugees.16
Deliberations eventually resulted in the creation of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a subsidiary organ of the United Nation General
Assembly, in December 1950.
The UNHCR:
. . . was intended as a temporary body with a three-year life, [beginning
January 1, 1951], during which time it was to provide protection and
assistance to refugees. But being supplied with financial resources for
administrative costs only, it did not have the means to enforce the
international legal norms for the world’s refugees.17
The UNHCR and the adoption of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
16
17

Cutts, 19.

Loescher, Beyond Charity, 55. See also: Loescher, Betts and Milner, The United
Nations, 2008 ed., 75: The UNHCR’s mandate was usually extended by the General
Assembly in increments of five years. Not until December 2003 did the General
Assembly remove “the temporal limitation on the continuation of UNHCR and confirmed
the Office as a program of the United Nations, [as stated in General Assembly Resolution
58/153], “until the refugee problem is solved.”” See also: Mark Gibney, Global Refugee
Crisis: A Reference Handbook. 2nd ed. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2010).
(Hereafter cited as: Gibney, Global Refugee Crisis), 118: At the time of the UNHCR’s
inception there were approximately 1.5 million refugees worldwide. Most were in
Europe, but also in Asia (Hong Kong and Macau) and in Latin America.
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to the Status of Refugees “provided for the first time, a formal structure for responding
to the needs of refugees and standards for the protection of refugees under international
law.”18 The core directive set forth for the UNHCR was to provide two specific
functions: “first, to provide international protection for refugees: and second, to seek
permanent solutions to the problem of refugees by assisting governments to facilitate
their voluntary repatriation or their assimilation within new national communities.”19
What resulted was an office, whose mandate severely limited its political and economical
scope of functions.
From a political perspective, the UNHCR’s mandate is, “premised on the
understanding that states have the primary responsibility for the protection of refugees.
UNHCR’s role is to assist and oversee states in meeting their obligation towards
refugees, not to take on the role on their behalf.”20
From an economic standpoint, funding for the UNHCR was inadequate and
problematic from its inception:
Each project to aid refugees had to be financed through voluntary
contributions, mostly from states. It was not given the resources to
implement a repatriation programme such as the one carried out by
UNRRA or a resettlement programme such as that carried out by the IRO.
Rather, it was required to provide international protection and to promote
solutions for refugee problems with a small budget. As the first UN High

18

Cutts, 2. (The Convention was adopted on July 28, 1951.)

19

Ibid., 22.

20

Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher, Refugees in International Relations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 82.

12
Commissioner for Refugees, Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart,
expressed it, there was a real danger his office would simply ‘administer
misery’.21
As a result of the financial restraints of the Statute of 1950, the UNHCR has
always been highly reliant on donor governments, international non-governmental
organizations and non-governmental organizations for financial support. Approximately
three-quarters of the UNHCR’s budget currently come from its top ten donors.22
Each year the UNHCR’s budget is submitted to the Executive Committee of the
Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (ExCom).
The Office of the UNHCR then publishes its annual Global Appeal, which lists projected
needs for the forthcoming year. The Office of the UNHCR then meets with potential
donors at an annual pledging conference at which time donors pledge funding to the
Office of UNHCR for the upcoming year. There is, however, no mechanism to insure
that pledged contributions are actually given.23

21

Cutts, 22.

22

Alexander Betts, Gil Loescher and James Milner, The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection
into the 21st Century (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012). (Hereafter cited
as: Betts, Loescher and Milner, UNHCR: The Politics, 2012 ed.), 98: Global Report
(2009) listing of top ten donors: United States – 37.0%, European Commission – 7.0%,
Japan – 6.0%, Sweden – 6.0%, Netherlands – 5.0%, UN Sources – 4.0%, Norway –
4.0%, Germany – 3.0%, Denmark – 3.0%, Private Donors – 3.0%. See also: Loescher,
Betts and Milner, 2008 ed., 92: Currently, contributions from the UN Regular Budget
“account for less than 3 percent of UNHCR’s Annual Budget. As a result, UNHCR is
almost exclusively dependent on voluntary contributions to carry out its programs.”
23

Cassandra Rachel Veney, Forced Migration in Eastern Africa: Democratization,
Structural Adjustment, and Refugees (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). (Hereafter
cited as: Veney), 156.
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Additionally, since donor states may earmark funding, the UNHCR finds itself
in a politically precarious position:24
On the one hand, it [The Office of the UNHCR] has attempted to
safeguard the integrity of its mandate by being seen to be politically
impartial. On the other hand its existence and ability to carry out its
programs have been dependent upon its ability to respond to the interests
of a relatively small number of donor states.25
As Loescher, Betts and Milner suggest, the practice of earmarking funds can often be
based on states “interests” rather than refugees’ “needs” making funding highly
selective.26 “More than 50 years later, this dependency continues to be the most
significant means through which states are able to control the scope of UNHCR’s
work.”27
Additionally, the lack of permanent funding makes long-term planning
problematical. Some donor funding, for example, needs to be spent “and produce
tangible outcomes within a one-year period. . . . [As a result] donor funds tend to be
earmarked only for relief and not development programmes and this leads to a
bureaucratic interest in keeping affected populations dependent, inhibiting the search for

24

Loescher, Betts and Milner, The United Nations, 2008 ed., 92-93: “In 2006, 53 percent
of contributions to UNHCR were “tightly earmarked” for specific countries and
activities, while 28 percent were “lightly earmarked” for specific geographical regions
and only 20 percent came with no restrictions.”
25

Ibid., 92.

26

Ibid., 93.

27

Ibid., 14.

permanent solutions.”

28
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Therefore, “in any given year, UNHCR cannot predict what

funds it will have available for particular programs. As such, engagement in areas that
require multi-year commitments, such as development and rehabilitation for returning
refugee populations, are very difficult.”29
The ideological basis for the UNHCR’s work was defined in the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.30 The Convention defines the
obligations and rights of both refugees and host nation-states. Additionally, it:
. . . sets out international standards for the treatment of refugees. It
embodies principles that promote and safeguard refugees’ rights in the
fields of employment, education, residence, freedom of movement, access
to courts, naturalization and above all, the security against return to a
country where they may risk persecution.31
28

Cindy Horst, Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the
Dadaab Camps of Kenya (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006). (Hereafter will be cited
as: Transnational Nomads), 114-115.
29

Loescher, Betts and Milner, The United Nations, 2008 ed., 92.

30

Cutts, 24.

31

Cutts, 23-24; Article 1(2) of the Geneva Convention defines refugee as any person
who: “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality or being outside
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing
to such fear is unwilling to return to it.” Additionally, “the adoption of this definition of
the term refugee marked a significant change in policy, as it meant that refugees would
now be identified not only on a group basis, as has been the case in preceding years, but
also on an individual case-by-case basis. . . . Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention
states: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or
political opinion.” See also: Loescher, Betts and Milner, The United Nations, 2008 ed.,
15-16: Non-refoulment: the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where they
risk persecution . . . remains the cornerstone of international refugee protection, and is

15
As stated earlier, “Western governments were mainly interested in limiting their
financial and legal obligations to refugees.”32 Western interest in the UNHCR, however,
increased over time. Loescher suggests that the United States attitude toward the
UNHCR partially changed due to the ideological struggle between the West and the East
in regard to forced human displacement. The West encouraged resettlement while the
East encouraged repatriation:33
American preoccupation [with] the rapidly developing Cold War critically
affected the lens through which Washington viewed both its own refugee
policy and UNHCR. U.S. policy-makers soon considered refugee issues
within the same policy framework as national security. U.S. generosity
towards refugees from Eastern Europe was in part motivated by a desire to
“roll back”, or at least contain, Communism by encouraging East
European citizens to escape their homelands. Refugees also became
important symbols in the ideological rivalry of the early Cold War. 34
Refugee flows moved from the European theatre in the late 1950s to Asia and
Africa in the 1960s, at which point refugee movements were primarily a result of three

now considered to be a provision of customary international law, binding even on states
not party to the 1951 convention.
32

Loescher, Beyond Charity, 57.

33

Ibid, 67. See also: Arthur Helton, “Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An
Unfilled Promise,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 17 (1984): 243-246:
“The United States policy until 1980 was that refugee admissions were limited by law to
individuals fleeing communist countries or countries in the Middle East. Of the 233,436
refugees admitted between 1956 and 1968, all but 925 were from communist countries.
Thus, for political and ideological reasons, refugees from communism were welcomed, if
not encouraged, to “vote with their feet,” particularly at the height of the Cold War.”
34

Loescher, Betts and Milner, The United Nations, 2008 ed., 20.

16
types of civil discord: intrastate conflicts, wars of liberation and interstate conflicts, or
a combination thereof.35 By 1965 there were approximately 850,000 refugees in Africa:
Although many of those who fled during the independence struggles were
able to return within a relatively short period, new conflicts created further
outflows and by the end of the decade the number of refugees in Africa
had risen to around one million. In size, character and needs, these
successive refugee groups were very different from those in Europe and
they called for a new approach to the question of how to determine
refugee status.36
“By the mid-1960s, the UN Refugee Convention did not apply to the majority of refugees
being assisted by UNHCR.”37 Due to the large numbers of asylum seekers, it became
“impracticable to screen each individual in order to establish whether or not the person
had a well-founded fear of persecution. UNHCR therefore resorted to prima facie [or]
group determination of refugee status whereby, in the light of circumstances that led to
departure from the country of origin, refugees could be identified on a group basis.”38
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The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was an attempt on the part
of African leaders to address the change seen in refugee flows of the 1960s. “The 1951
convention, based on the European experience, was not fully appropriate to Africa
because African refugees fled not only persecution but conflict:”39
As new refugee groups emerged in the 1960s, however, it became
increasing apparent that existing international legal norms were not
suitable for dealing with refugee issues in the developing world. Refugees
in Africa and Asia had not fled as a result of conditions in Europe before
1951 nor could many of them meet the individual persecution criteria
outlined in the international legal instruments.40
The 1967 protocol removed the temporal date from the convention as well as the
European geographic limitation. Additionally:
. . . it laid down the principles that were later to find expression
in the 1969 OAU convention on refugees. In addition to the wider refugee
was to be written into the OAU convention, African leaders agreed that
asylum was to be regarded as a humanitarian act, not as a political act
reflecting any hostility toward the country of origin.41
In a further effort to address the unique characteristics of forced migration flows
in Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the 1969 OAU Refugee
without having to be interviewed or have their claim to refugee status assessed on an
individual basis. It is normally granted to people fleeing war zones in large numbers,
where it is generally accepted that they are refugees: they do not have to prove it through
interview and assessment.” The ‘Lost Boys of Sudan’ were one such group. (For
discussion of the Lost Boys of Sudan, see Chapter 2.) For detailed discussion of prima
facie status refer to: Matthew Albert, "Governance and Prima Facie Refugee Status
Determination: Clarifying the Boundaries of Temporary Protection, Group
Determination, and Mass Influx," Refugee Survey Quarterly 29, Issue 1 (2010): 61-91.
39
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The OAU

convention broadened the 1951 definition of the term “refugee,” which would now
include a person which fled due to “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination
or events seriously disrupting public order in either part or the whole of his country of
origin or nationality.” Additionally, the OAU Convention elaborated on the obligations
of the receiving nation-states.43
Jeff Crisp, Head of Policy Development and Evaluation at UNHCR, notes that
the period from the 1960s to the 1980s has been labeled the “golden age” of asylum in
Africa during which “a largely well-deserved reputation as a continent which treated
refugees in a relatively generous manner:”44
In general, governments allowed large numbers of refugees to enter and
remain on their territory. Many refugees enjoyed reasonably secure living
conditions and were able to benefit from a range of legal, social and
economic rights. Considerable numbers of refugees were provided with
land and encouraged to become self-sufficient. In some states, refugees
were allowed to settle permanently and to become naturalized citizens.
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While the deportation and expulsion of refugees was not unknown the
principle of voluntary repatriation was broadly respected.45
Crisp goes on to explain that the “principle and practice of asylum” was bolstered by
ideologies of pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism. “Political leaders such as Julius
Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda set a positive example in the refugee policies which they
pursued.”46 Additionally, “the relative prosperity of many African states in the early
years of independence and the modest size of the refugee movements which took place at
this time enabled those countries to shoulder the economic burden imposed by the
presence from neighboring and nearby states.”47 Crisp continues:
The principle and practice of asylum in Africa was further buttressed by
international aid. Across much of the continent, an implicit deal was
struck whereby African states admitted refugees to their territory and
provided the land required to accommodate them. And as a reciprocal
gesture (often referred to . . . as “burden sharing”) donor states provided
the funding – much of it channeled though UNHCR – required to feed,
shelter, educate and provide health care to the refugees. As well as
mitigating the impact of the refugee presence, it must be added, such
assistance programmes provided African states and elites with a welcome
source of foreign exchange, employment and commercial opportunities.48
Under the principle of burden sharing, refugee-hosting nation-states theoretically could
call upon other nation-states to assist, “either by providing relief or by providing
additional asylum space.”49
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Numerous refugee flows occurred on the Horn of Africa due to both civil
conflict and famine. The famines of the 1970s contributed to refugee flows both directly
as individuals:
. . . crossed international boundaries in search of relief, and indirectly, as
the effects of the famine exacerbated latent or on going social conflicts.
In Ethiopia, the 1973 famine contributed to a social revolution.
Conversely, the violence unleashed by the conflicts compounded the
crisis of subsistence.50
Amplification of transhumant displacement has magnified over the past four decades
with the most recent human displacement occurring from within Somalia.
By the start of the 1980s, refugees in Africa exceeded 3 million.51 Due to massive
displacements during these years, the UNHRC provided assistance “on a much greater
scale than ever before. One of the main challenges was that of managing large refugee
camps.”52 As Loescher, Betts and Milner suggest, the 1980s:
. . . ushered in a new era of restrictions and challenges. Economic
recession and the election of conservative governments in many Western
states led to a shift away from the focus on human rights that had defined
the post-war era and resulted in the introduction of increasingly restrictive
asylum policies which diminished the authority of the UNHCR in global
North.53
Additionally, “as rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union caused both
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powers to support local clients, internal conflicts became globalized and extremely
violent:”54
Consequently, regional and intra-state conflicts in Indochina, Afghanistan,
Central America, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa became
prolonged and debilitating affairs, and generated large waves of refugees.
As a result, the global refugee population tripled from 3 million in 1977 to
over 10 million in 1982.55
By the mid-1980s, most overseas resettlement programs had dramatically
reduced and Third World host governments restricted local integration to
all but a few refugees. This lack of solutions meant that the majority of the
world’s refugees were given temporary asylum in camps, with no prospect
of effective long-term solutions.56
In regard to the formation and maintenance of large refugee camps, Loescher,
Betts and Milner suggest that the Office of the UNHCR’s “believed that by assembling
refugees in one place they could better supply them with food and shelter and other basic
necessities upon which their survival depended.”57 Further, by assembling refugees in a
singular place, donor attention could be focused on a tangible need.58
The increase of refugee numbers in the 1980s:
. . . and the protracted nature of refugees situations eventually strained
UNHCR’s administrative and financial structures to breaking point. The
global refugee total grew steadily from 10 million in 1980 to 17 million by
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the end of the decade. . . . In fact, UNHCR’s funding per refugee fell by
more than 50 percent in constant US dollars between 1980 and 1989.59
Continual growth in the numbers of refugees, in combination with decreasing funds, the
UNHCR had to rely more heavily on the INGO/NGO community for support and
assistance. Seemingly, “once the Cold War had come to an end, donor states had less
interest in using refugee assistance programmes as a means of developing closer ties with
actual and potential allies in the fight against communism.”60 “What distinguished the
1990s from earlier decades was the weakening of central governments in countries that
had been shored up by superpower support, and the consequent proliferation of
identity-based conflicts, many which had engaged whole societies in violence.”61
In the North, the end of the Cold War was:
. . . marked by a shift “from asylum to containment”. . . . [While] in the
South . . . states . . . [responded] to the mass arrival and prolonged
presence of refugees by placing limits on the quantity and quality of
asylum they offer[ed].62
Some nation-states limited the:
. . . quantity of asylum they offered to refugees, by closing their borders to
prevent arrivals, by pushing for the early and often unsustainable return of
refugees to their country of origin, and, in exceptional cases, forcibly
59
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expelling entire refugee populations. More generally, states have been
placing limits on the quality of asylum they offer to refugees, by denying
them the social and economic rights contained in the 1951 Convention,
such as freedom of movement and the right to seek employment.63
“Refugee movements are no longer side effects of conflict, but in many cases are
central to the objectives and tactics of war.”64 “UNHCR now had to work with
governments and opposition movements and guerilla factions, often in the context of
collapsing states and where population displacement was among the central objectives of
war.”65 By the mid-1990s, the UNHCR was forced “to operate on an unprecedented
scale in the midst of armed conflict” in venues such as northern Iraq, former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda.66 Additionally, “UNHCR’s focus during the 1990s was mainly on the
provision of assistance in humanitarian emergencies, and it placed less emphasis on
enhancing refugee protection or on finding durable solutions other than repatriation the
emergency phase was over.”67 To date, many such refugee situations remain
unanswered:
The optimism that characterized the end of the Cold War quickly
evaporated as the international community failed to effectively respond to
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a number of new crises, including the collapse of Somalia, the break-up
of the former Yugoslavia, and the genocide in Rwanda.68
The lack of assistance from the international community left the UNHCR to deal with
overwhelmingly impossible humanitarian emergencies; the genocide in Rwanda in 1994,
the militarization of refugee camps in Zaire in 1994-1996, and “the failure to protect and
assist the Rwandan refugees driven into eastern Zaire from late 1996 onward.”69
As the 1990s progressed the number of intra-state conflicts “decreased by some
40 percent by 2005. Consequently, there were fewer refugee emergencies than during the
1990s, and large numbers of refugees returned home as several acute conflicts
resolved.”70
As the numbers of refugees decreased worldwide, the duration of their stay in
camps increased. By 2004, approximately two-thirds of the world’s refugees were living
in protracted refugee situations, “with the average duration of a refugee situation having
almost doubled from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2004.”71 The UNHCR estimated that
by the end of 2004 “there were 33 major protracted refugee situations, with a total
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“Failure to achieve appropriate solutions has

meant that refugees by the millions remain in camps and settlements. Designed as
temporary accommodations, they have by default, become permanent.”73 As Jamal
suggests:
. . . when a person flees for his or her life, a plastic shelter, a jerrycan of
water and a container of maizemeal provided in a camp far from home
may be exactly what that person needs. Five years on, though, and those
same minimum standards that once protected life will, if unchanged,
contrive to stifle it.74
That prospect was never foreseen when the UNHCR was created in 1951.
Neither the UN nor the refugees they assisted saw their situation as long-term.
And, indeed, the European refugees of the era were ultimately relocated either to their
homelands or to host-nations willing to absorb them. But in recent years, pursuant to the
explosion of intra-state wars specifically aimed at displacing people, refugee populations
have resurged in Africa. Currently there is little hope of either reintegrating those into
their homelands or of absorbing them into their host nation-states.
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Sudan may be a hopeful exception. After nearly fifty years of war interspersed
with only brief periods of relative accord, southern Sudan and its African population
seceded from the Arab and Islamic north, becoming its own nation-state, South Sudan,
on July 9, 2011. Many of the displaced southern Sudanese are housed at Kakuma
Refugee Camp in northern Kenya. Some have already repatriated, and there is a distinct
possibility that many of them will return to their communities of origin.
The question is, to what will they be returning after their long absences, and can they
somehow be prepared for it while still at Kakuma? In order to begin assessing the
possibilities, the following chapter will examine the evolution of the context and the
aftermath of the long struggle leading to the birth of South Sudan.
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CHAPTER 2
SUDAN: FROM NORTHERN OPPRESSION TO SOUTHERN SECESSION

A primary purpose of this overview is to render a very complex history and
political, economic and social reality understandable to the general reader on the one
hand. On the other, a principal function of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for
the possible establishment of income-generating programs for marginalized women
in The Republic of South Sudan as a post-conflict venue. This chapter is, therefore, of
necessity, an abbreviated overview.
In this narrative, “South Sudan” with an upper case “S” will only be used to refer
to the newly formed nation-state of The Republic of South Sudan - July 9, 2011 and
thereafter. “The Sudan,” a coined colonial term, will, for the purpose of this narrative,
refer to the period between the early 1820s and January 1, 1956, at which time Sudan
achieved independence from both British and Egyptian Governments.1 “Sudan” rather
than “the Sudan” will reflect the years following 1956 to the present. Therefore, it should
be kept in mind that “Sudan” between January 1, 1956 and July 9, 2011 will refer to the
1

John Ryles and Justin Willis, “Introduction: Many Sudans,” in The Sudan Handbook,
edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok (Suffolk: James
Currey Ltd, 2011). (Hereafter cited as: Ryle et al., The Sudan Handbook), 4: “At the end
of the 1890s, with the defeat of the Mahdists and the establishment of Anglo-Egyptian
rule, ‘the Sudan’ became fixed as the title of a political unit, its borders defined partly by
the historic claims of Egypt and more immediately by the claims of Britain, Belgium,
France and Ethiopia to the land around it.”

28
former Republic of Sudan. Post - July 9, 2011 “Sudan” refers to present-day Sudan
after South Sudanese independence. Lower case “southern Sudan” and “northern Sudan”
will reference geographic, not political boundaries.2
The Sudan, until 1821, was a collection of small, independent kingdoms and
principalities.3 The history of the Sudan as a political entity began in northern Sudan
with the Turco-Egyptian conquest of 1821-1823, in the quest for gold, ivory and slaves.
Peter Verney, citing Richard Gray, proposes that the invasion “marked the beginning of
the North-South divide, with the independence of the Southern Sudanese peoples and
kingdoms either destroyed or seriously undermined by a Muslim state:”4
The Turkiyya established military garrisons, constructed telegraph lines,
and collected taxes in the north. . . . Over time, the government developed
administrative structures, established schools, improved communications
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and security, and dammed seasonal rivers, all of which encouraged
economic growth and both internal and external commerce in the north.5
The south, [however], was not effectively controlled by the government
nor did it benefit from state services. . . . In addition to the bitter and
negative encounters [slave raiding and enslavement] between the state and
the people of the south, there has never really been a historical oneness
between the people of the south and those living in the north6
As Douglas Johnson explains, it was during the Turkiyya that the pattern was set
“whereby religion and racial origin influenced access to political power and economic
opportunities.”7
Shortly after Britain became protector to Egypt, the Turkiyya were defeated and
overthrown by Mahdiyya a fundamentalist, indigenous, politico-religious movement that
controlled most of the Egyptian Sudan, from 1881-1898.8 Mounting colonial rivalry to
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partition Africa in the latter half of the 1890s heightened, prompting Britain to
undertake a reconquest of what had been relinquished to the Mahdiyya 16 years
previously.9 As a result in 1899 a joint government, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium
was established between Egypt and Britain via the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement.10
The agreement restored Egyptian sovereignty and “provided for a “condominium”
whereby Britain assumed complete responsibility for the government.”11 Justin Willis
suggests: “Britain was in the Sudan to stop anyone else from being there, and control of
the state was primarily for this end.”12
Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo noted that:
Far from integrating the country, British policies, guided essentially by the
objectives of maintaining hegemony in the Middle East, crystallized
Sudanese dualism. . . . Concerned with limiting the expansion of Islam as
compromised. . . . Built on the dissatisfactions of those on the margin of the Islamic
world, they appealed to those who had most reason to fear enslavement. Adherence to
Islam offered a less arbitrary political system, one which took account of religion and not
skin colour.
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well as protecting the southerners from further slave raids,
administrators and missionaries encouraged the emergence of a distinct
southern culture founded on Christianity and the use of English (rather
than Arabic) as a common language. This policy was formalized in the
1920s into a “closed door” policy.13
The “Closed Door” policy also known as, the “Closed District Ordinance” was
formalized, “whereby northerners as well as foreigners other than the British were not
allowed into the south.”14 Some contend that:
The ostensible reason for this policy of isolation was to end northern
pressure on and dominance of the south and Nuba Mountains. The orders
were intended to stop Arab tribes from seizing slaves, cattle and grain
from the south, and to end the alleged pressure to convert to Islam.
Missionaries and many government officials sought to keep Arab and
Islamic influences out of East Africa. More broadly, British officials
sought to keep Arab and Islamic influences out of East Africa.15
The British, as Oostland and Berkvens suggest, intended southern Sudan “to develop
independently from the north so that it acted as a buffer against the dominant Arab
culture.”16 “Consideration was even given to separating the region from Sudan
altogether, linking it perhaps with Uganda or making it into a separate colonial entity
within an East African federation to be ruled from Nairobi.”17 Alternately, Robert
Collins suggests that the: “Southern Policy” was actually a result of ideological
13
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indifference. The “Southern Policy” appeared to be a conscious effort on the part of
the British to promote “the separation of northern and southern Sudan, but in reality the
British did not know what to do with southern Sudan, so that individual initiative,
isolation, and ad hoc administrative decisions represented more a muddle than any
coordinated and consistent policy.”18 The consequences of separate administration of
northern and southern Sudan created the pre-condition to yield an entirely northern
focused state, at the time of independence. Peter Verney suggests that:
. . . the main defect of British administration on Southern Sudan was its
failure to develop local economic and administrative infrastructures.
The emphasis on “tribal” administration and its limited aspirations
regarding social and economic development meant that there was very
little need for educated Southern Sudanese. Education in Southern Sudan
was badly neglected. Economic development was also severely
restricted.19
In 1930, the British established the “Native Administration” also known as the
“Southern Policy” which reinforced what was already occurring on the ground.
The north and the south were to be governed as two separate regions due to the numerous
cultural and religious differences. The assumption was that southern Sudan, due to its
perceived commonalties, would be linked to British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania) not to northern Sudan and the Middle East. The Southern Policy allowed for
indigenous laws and customs to be practiced throughout the south while Islamic laws
18
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and customs were to be practiced throughout the north. “The implication of the
Southern Policy widened the gap between the north and south even further, creating a
negative effect on the south as a whole.”20 According to Douglas Johnson:
Up until 1947 Britain, or at least the Foreign Office, had not been fully
committed to administrating the South as part of the Sudan, entertaining
the untested notion that it might eventually be linked to the East African
colonies. With Egyptian and northern Sudanese nationalist insistence on
a united Sudan, however, this option (never vigorously pursued) was
closed.21
In December 1946 the Southern Policy was reversed when “the British formally
acceded to pressure from northern politicians and the Egyptian government to keep the
south within a united Sudan.”22 “This contradictory and confused approach to governing
Sudan deepened the gulf between north and south and set the stage for the conflict that
would erupt even before the country was formally granted independence.”23
Shortly before independence, in 1954, combined Southern leadership agreed,
“to support a federal constitution as the condition for remaining in a united Sudan, failing
which they would reserve the south’s right to self-determination.”24

20

Martha Donkor, Sudanese Refugees in the United States: The Collateral Damage of
Sudan's Civil War (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edward Mellen Press, 2008). (Hereafter cited as:
Donker), 36.
21

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars – Peace or Truce, 2011, 25.

22

Lesch, 34: “Egypt wanted the Nile Valley to remain united under its monarchy.”

23

Donkor, 37.

24

Rift Valley Institute, The Sudan Course Book, 53.

34
The period between 1953 and 1956 was a transition that led to self-governance
and self-determination of the newly united Sudan. Sudan was granted its independence
on January 1, 1956 - becoming the first of Britain’s African colonies to achieve
independence after World War II.25 There were constitutional issues, however.
At the time of independence the provisional constitution was unclear regarding whether
Sudan was to be secular or Islamic.26 Also unresolved was whether its structure was to
be federal or unity in structure. Further, along with discord over race, religion and
national identity, the first civil war was to be fought primarily over issues of political
exclusion and domination.27
The conventional date for the beginning of civil discord is August 1955, four
months before Sudan officially achieved its independence. Southern troops mutinied in
response to a rumor that they were to be moved north after independence:
The [Torit] mutiny is held by many to have highlighted and emphasized
the ethnic, religious and cultural division between the northern and
southern regions of the country, the mistrust between the leaders involved,
and the effects of a traditional British policy of administering the two
areas separately and very differently, at least until the Second World War.
Whether it also mark[ed] the beginning of a sixteen-year struggle between
southern political movements and the Khartoum Government . . . is
another question.28
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Douglas Johnson, former advisor to GoSS (Government of South Sudan) on the
north-south boundary and member of the Abeyei Boundary Commission, argues that it is
inaccurate to date the start of the civil war to the Torit Mutiny for “aside from the
activities of a few dispersed mutineers, there was very little fighting in the south for the
rest of the decade.”29 He contends that the first civil war began during 1962-1963 with
“the formation of the first exile political movement, the Sudan African Closed District
National Union which later . . . became SANU, and 1963 saw the first organized military
activity of guerilla units . . . [known as], ‘Anyanya’.”30 “It is from this time (1962-1963)
that the first civil war can be said to have begun.”31 The first civil war “began in the
early 1960s during Sudan’s first military dictatorship, when the central government
pursued an aggressive policy of Arabization and Islamization and regarded any talk of
federalism as sedition.”32
General Ibrahim Abboud seized power through a military coup (1958-1964),
dissolving all political parties, “which ended what was considered a promising though
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schoolboys. . . . Operating largely as independent bands, the Anyanya at first lacked an
external military patron and so relied mainly on captured weapons and supplies from the
Sudanese army. Subsequently, however, some arms became available from Ethiopia, in
return for Sudan’s support of the Eritrean insurgents, as well as [eventually] from Israel,
which viewed the conflict as an opportunity to weaken Arab control over the Red Sea.”
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fledgling participatory democratic process in the north.”

36
Shortly after coming to

power, the military government launched an:
. . . “arabization” policy, which entailed closing all English-language
educational institutions (1964) and eliminating all English speakers – that
is, the entire southern elite – from the regional administration. Plans were
also made to colonize the south with over a million Arabs. With the
political parties completely suppressed, relations between the regions
continued to deteriorate, and by 1963 the south was engulfed in violence.34
Southern political elites fled to neighboring nation-states such as Uganda and Zaire in
response to Abbud’s repressive measures. From 1963 on, massive population
movements occurred within the south due to civil conflict.35 By the end of the following
year, all Christian missionaries had been expelled in an attempt to further both
Arabization and Islamization.36
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Concurrently, Abboud’s military regime was forced out of office due to
Khartoum’s public discontent over a weak economy, political repression and the
escalation of civil war in the South.37 Between 1966-1969, a number of coalition
governments governed Sudan.
In 1969, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri gained power in Sudan’s second military coup
ruling through what Jok Madut Jok described as “a brutally uncompromising military
junta.”38 However, by 1971:
Nimeiri did an about turn, and instead of continuing his militaristic
attitude to the southern opposition, began to make contact with the
southern guerrilla movement with suggestions for peace negotiations.39
The result was the 1972 Addis Agreement, also known as the Addis Accord, which
brought the war to an end. The central provisions of the Addis Accord focused on
southern regional autonomy, allowing for the southern provinces to unify, granting them
both political and administrative autonomy “and the authority to create their own cultural
policy.”40 Under the Addis Accord, the south was to become a semi-autonomous region
with Juba as its capital. The south was to be governed by a regional assembly and a high
executive council, which was responsible for internal administration and security.
Additionally, plebiscites were to be held in border areas to determine if those areas would
remain in the North or secede to the South. “The Accord also stated that, while Arabic
37
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would be the official language of the Sudan, north and south, English would be the
“common language” of the south and would be taught in schools [and used in regional
administration]:”41
The relationship between the central and regional governments, however,
remained ambiguous. Nimeiri intervened several times in Southern
regional elections and in decisions concerning the economic development
of the South. . . . Policies were frequently established in Khartoum without
reference to the regional government.42
As a result of growing opposition amongst emerging forces from the ex-Anyanya,
Nimeiri began to centralize power. Consequently, Nimeiri “progressively shed his
liberal-minded Northern Sudanese allies from his coalition . . .” as he incorporated
conservative groups such as Hassan al-Turabi’s Muslim Brothers and Sadiq al-Mahdi’s
Ansar.43 The U.S. State Department, in an analysis suggested:
The scales against the peace agreement were tipped in 1979 when
Chevron discovered oil in the south. Northern pressure built to abrogate
those provisions of the peace treaty granting financial autonomy to the
south. Ultimately, Nimeiri abolished the Southern region, declared Arabic
the official language in the South and transferred control of the Southern
armed forces to the central government.44
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In 1980, the Nimeiri government unsuccessfully attempted to redraw southern
borders. This clearly signaled Khartoum’s determination “to keep the development of the
oil fields firmly under central, rather than regional, control:” 45
In October 1981 Nimeiri dissolved the southern assembly and dismissed
the regional government, installing a caretaker administration favoring
redivision; anti-division activities were later arrested. Khartoum also
decided to locate the principal oil refinery in the north rather than close to
the oil fields.46
In 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Movement (SPLM/SPLA), was
formed in Ethiopia under John Garang.47 The following month, September, Nimeiri
abolished the Addis Ababa Accord, attempted to impose shari’a law as the basis for the
Sudanese legal system and proclaimed Arabic as the sole official language throughout all
of Sudan. These decrees came to be known as the ‘September Laws.’48 Cassandra
Veney, citing Jok and Hutchinson noted that:
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Ryle et al., The Sudan Handbook, 2010, 206: John Garang de Mabior (1945-2005).
Garang, a Dinka, completed his secondary education in Tanzania. He was granted a
scholarship from Grinnell Collage in Iowa where he studied economics. Upon returning
to Sudan he joined the Anyanya guerrilla movement. “After the 1972 Addis Ababa
Agreement he was integrated into the Sudanese Army. He returned to Iowa to complete a
PhD in Agricultural Economics. In 1983 he became leader of the SPLM/A, with the
stated aim of creating a democratic, secular and united ‘New Sudan’.” Three weeks after
being sworn in as the first Vice President, John Garang died in a helicopter crash.
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A major catalyst for the civil war was the imposition of Islamic shari’a
law throughout the country that served to alienate large populations in the
southern part of the country, most of whom were not Muslim. But this was
not simply a religious conflict between northern Muslims and southern
Christians or a battle based solely on regional, religious, and ethnic
differences between “Arabs” and “Africans” as portrayed in the Western
media.49
The 2nd civil war began in 1983, whereupon “Sudan’s second military regime
sought to establish firm control over southern mineral and water resources and to impose
an Islamic state on the country.”50 Additionally, the central government’s economic
policies favored “the establishment of large mechanised farms located mainly within the
north-south borderlands and leased out to government clients, which involved the
dispossession of large numbers of subsistence farmers and herders from the customary
rights to land.”51 Under Nimeiri:

“be the sole and guiding force behind the law of the Sudan” essentially making Sudan
an Islamic republic. For a comprehensive history of Sudan from 1956 through the
present see: Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars – Peace or
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Sudan was left mired in debt on a scale far greater than it had ever
experienced before. Hopes of wealth from oil had been dashed by the
renewal of civil war. Yet Nimeiri and those around him were widely
believed to have made considerable personal gains, often by corrupt
means. Thus, the gap between rich and poor grew, a situation emphasized
when famine struck the western regions of Kordofan and Darfur in the
early 1980s. The government did little or nothing to alleviate the
sufferings of Darfuris.52
The outbreak and spread of renewed civil war in southern Sudan
interrupted oil exploration and other development projects, halting foreign
investment. The SPLA targeted prominent international projects in 1984.
Three expatriate oil workers were killed in an attack on Chevron’s
Rubkona base near Bentiu on 3 February.53
Shortly thereafter, Chevron pulled out of Sudan.
Further, the misery of the famine in Northern Bahr el Ghazel and Southern
Kordofan from 1983-1985 was amplified by the deliberate scorched earth policy and
relief denial policies of government militias and the SPLA. In 1988, 250,000 people had
died of hunger-related diseases.54 It was in consequence to those circumstances that the
world’s first program to assist populations on either side of a conflict; Operation Lifeline
Sudan (OLS) was formed in 1989. OLS was an UN-led entity comprised of a network of
NGOs whose mission was to respond to famine and civil war in Sudan.
As a result of economic, social and political discontent, Jaafer Nimeiri’s regime
was overthrown by a military coup in 1985, yielding civilian rule for a year until
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elections ushered in parliamentary rule. Two unstable coalition governments followed,
making way for the military coup which swept Omar Hassan al-Bashir and the National
Islamist Front (NIF) into power, in 1989.55 Shortly after Bashir’s ascendancy, he
pronounced Sudan to be an Islamic state. By 1990, he had declared a state of emergency,
dissolved parliament and all political parties, along with trade unions and civil
associations:
The Bashir government combined internal political repression with
international Islamist activism. It supported radical Islamist groups in
Algeria and supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Khartoum was
established as a base for militant Islamist groups: radical movements and
terrorist organization. . . . In 1996, the UN imposed sanctions on Sudan for
alleged connections to the assassination attempt on Egyptian President
Mubarak.56
In 1993, al-Bashir was appointed president of Sudan. After two years of
heavy-handed stability, China invested in the development of southern oil resources in
1995. Bashir’s 1996 election as president for five years also bore Chinese fruit.
By 1999, a 1,100 km pipeline from southern Sudan to Port Sudan was completed and oil
exports began. Before long, oil constituted the vast majority of Sudan’s exports,
thereafter driving both policy and action toward southern Sudan.57 Fundamentally, the
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increased revenues can be seen as the vehicle that rendered the processes of
Islamization and Arabization begun during the 1960s more expansive and more militarily
aggressive. The oil revenues used almost exclusively for the development of northern
infrastructure also provided the resources needed for a northern arms build-up which was
to support al-Bashir's action against Darfur on a strictly Arab justification, as well as his
incursions into southern Sudan on both religious and ethnic premises.58
However, yielding to international pressure in 2002, al-Bashir signed the
“Machakos Protocol” which later became the framework for Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. The Machakos Protocol:
. . . established the framework of the future peace agreement, committing
both sides to the unity of the country, but granting the south the option of
an independence referendum after an interim period. But the agreement
was between the government and the SPLM only. Neither the NDA
[National Democratic Alliance] nor any other opposition group in any part
of Sudan was included. . . .This was to have a significant impact on events
in Darfur in 2003.59
In 2003, Janjaweed attacks on Darfur began pursuant to a rebel incursion focused
on al-Fasher airport. This marked the beginning of the current conflict, which by 2004
was classified Darfur as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis” by the UN coordinator.60
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In 2005, the second civil war in southern Sudan came to an end with the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).61 The CPA intended to
restructure wealth, power and security structures in Sudan by sharing them between the
SPLM and the NCP.62 The CPA called for a “one country, two system” model, detailing
issues regarding: armed forces, autonomy, oil revenues, economic issues, administration,
and Islamic law:63
The 2005 CPA established a new Government of National Unity and the
interim Government of Southern Sudan. . . . The historic agreement
provides for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops from southern Sudan, and
the repatriation and resettlement of refugees. It also stipulated that by the
end of the fourth year of an interim period there would be elections at all
levels, including for national and southern Sudan president, state
governors, and national, southern Sudan, and state legislatures.64
As a result of the CPA, a power-sharing government was formed between the north and
south. Omar al-Bashir was sworn in as President and John Garang as First Vice President
of Sudan. Three weeks after taking office, Gargang died in a helicopter crash,
whereupon Salva Kiir Mayardit succeeded him as First Vice President of Sudan.65
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But intermediate government incursions into southern Sudan continued.
The frequently interrupted and uneasy peace leading to the ultimate secession of the
south from the north was punctuated by disputes over boundaries, oil resources, issues of
ethnicity, religion and race. Nonetheless, the referendum on independence for South
Sudan took place January 2011.66
South Sudan became a sovereign, independent nation-state July 9, 2011 and was
officially recognized as the 193rd member state of the United Nations on July 14, 2011.
Perhaps Cassandra Veney best sums up Sudan as:
. . . extraordinarily complex, and composed as it is of people from many
different ethnic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds that go beyond the
Arab-Christian, Arab-Black African, and North-South dichotomies often
peddled in the popular media. Its conflicts are rooted in colonial histories
of divide and rule and uneven regional development and postcolonial
despotism and inequalities. The enduring struggles for resources and
power that lie behind many of the country’s conflicts have been framed by
shifting political and economic regimes within the country as well as by
changing imperatives of regional and geopolitical dynamics and pressures.
The various conflicts have been articulated in different ideological
languages at different times. Some have been secessionist in the
inspiration, others for regime change of the central government; some
have been driven by secular struggles over the distribution of resources,
and religious fervor.67
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In conclusion, the challenges devolving from the creation of Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan are beyond those of most of Africa’s new nation-states. Unlike other colonies,
there was not an African led Nationalist movement or the emergence of an educated elite
to frame the creation of a new nation-state. The absence of those further contributed to
the South’s political marginalization. Conflicting strategies of British policy began even
before the formation of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and continued up to
independence. The British had made Khartoum the economic and political capital of
Sudan, despite their understanding that government of the whole of Sudan was both
untenable and unworkable, separating and marginalizing the south on all levels.
Furthermore, from 1956 forward, the primary goal of the Sudanese government
was the creation of an export economy. Consequently, early development projects
focused on the Nile with the creation and unsuccessful implementation of large
mechanized projects, which impaired economic growth in south Sudan. Also, the
progressively more pernicious efforts to Islamify and Arabize only served to aggravate
and deepen the rift between north and south. Additionally, to date, even borders which
had not been disputed have been violated by North Sudanese military forces.
And disputes concerning the apportionment of oil resources persist, yielding civil unrest,
violence and continuing forced displacement of South Sudanese populations – this while
the new nation is confronted with a host of returning refugees. International events have
also overshadowed the issues which face this new nation. On the one hand, the Arab
Spring has allowed al-Bashir’s regime to attack South Sudan, as well as his own people
with impunity. On the other, Salva Kiir’s plea for UN intervention has largely gone
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unanswered. At best, the potential of a peaceful post-conflict environment is a
precarious hope.
Clearly, there was enthusiastic embracement of South Sudan’s successful
secession from the northern state. All southerners had suffered from northern oppression.
There have already been factional rifts within the party and the army. Not all have
embraced Salva Kiir’s primacy. Only time will tell whether the rifts within the party and
the army can be bridged. A successful government must be formed, but it will have to
address more than its own unity. It will have to embrace the many ethnicities in its
central structures and strive to meet their political, social and economic welfare.
The creation of civil society will be achieved only if the oil wealth serves the whole of
the commonwealth. In other words, without the pressure of the North to unite the
population, South Sudan will have to face what almost every other African nation has
failed to achieve: the bridging of an ethnic ethos that has dragged so many into civil war.
The future is far from certain, and the success of any developmental project
undertaken in South Sudan will depend on a stable post-conflict environment.
Assuming that a modicum of civil tranquility is maintained, though, South Sudan does
hold possibilities for some intervention to help develop programs to reintegrate displaced
women and their children into the communities from which they have been alienated.
But whatever those prospects are, a study of their experiences while they were refugees
in Kenya needs to be included in preparation for that eventuality.
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CHAPTER 3
KAKUMA: AT THE CROSSROADS FROM EVERYWHERE TO NOWHERE

The second civil war in Sudan (1983-2005) was fought at monumental human
costs, claiming some two million lives, internally displacing over five million people and
producing approximately 690,000 refugees.1 It was this conflict which led to the creation
of a new refugee camp in northwestern Kenya: Kakuma.
Between 1987 to 1991, approximately 20,000 unaccompanied boys ranging from
about 7 to 17 years in age fled southern Sudan to avoid being captured or killed.2
They were bound for Ethiopia, seeking refuge there from southern Sudanese turmoil.
But they were targeted again and forced to flee Ethiopia under hot pursuit in 1991, when
the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime fell. Mengistu had been the SPLA’s main support,
providing both military training and bases for that southern Sudanese resistance.
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Persons of Concern to UNHCR,” Division of Operational Services UNHCR Geneva,
(9 June 2006): 15.
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Post-War Southern Sudan. (PhD diss., University of Sussex, 2010). (Hereafter cited as:
Grabska, In-Flux: (Re)negotiations of Gender), 149: “In the late 1980s, in need of
recruits, John Garang decided to create youth cadres who were trained in military camps
in Ethiopia. According to Human Rights Watch estimates there was between 17,000 and
40,000 young recruits (HRW 1994) trained in Ethiopia. They were referred to by Garang
as the “Red Army,” the “army without fear” or “Seeds of Sudan.””
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The change in regimes marked the cessation of Ethiopian support for the SPLA.
Those boys who survived their perilous flight from Ethiopia to Kenya via Sudan arrived,
in April 1992, at the end of the road just beyond the Kenyan border, Kakuma.3
Some had walked a total 1000 miles.
In July 1992, the Government of Kenya authorized the UNHCR to establish
Kakuma Refugee Camp in response to the arrival of the surviving 10,500 unaccompanied
Sudanese boys.4 Located in the Turkana District of the Rift Valley Province in northwest
Kenya, Kakuma lies 60-78 miles southeast of South Sudan’s disputed border and
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Numbers vary in regard to the initial arrival of unaccompanied Sudanese minors to
Kakuma. See: Ahlsten, Neil, Tracey Giang, Theresa Hwang, Ky Lam, Hilary Mathews,
Yuka Ogasawa, Karen Showalter, Corrie White, Megan Wilson, XinXin Yang; Advisor:
Howard Adelman, “Protracted Refugee Situations: A Case Analysis of Kakuma Camp,
Kenya,” Princeton Refugee Initiative of Woodward Wilson School [of] Public and
International Affairs. Princeton University. (January 2005). (Hereafter cited as: Princeton
Study, “A Case Analysis of Kakuma”): 12, cites: 10,500 as the arrival number to
Kakuma. Whereas Rebecca Horn in "Exploring the Impact of Displacement,” 358, cites:
an arrival number of 12,000; Abebe Feyissa and Rebecca Horn cites a similar number in
Hollenbach, Refugee Rights: Ethics, Advocacy, and Africa, 13; Bram J. Jansen in,
"Between Vulnerability and Assertiveness: Negotiating Resettlement in Kakuma Refugee
Camp, Kenya.” African Affairs 107, no. 429 (2008). (Hereafter cited as: Jansen,
“Between Vulnerability and Assertiveness”), 571, cites: 20,000 as the number of arrivals
to Kakuma in 1992. See also: Grabska, “Lost Boys, Invisible Girls,” 485: The term ‘lost
boys’ was given by the journalist and international aid workers that came in contact with
them. ‘Lost boys’ refers to Peter Pan and his orphaned companions ‘who clung together
to escape a hostile adult world.’; Ibid., 494: Approximately 3,500 ‘lost boys’ have been
resettled in 40 cities throughout the United States since 2000. Resettlement came to a halt
as a result of 9/11, resuming in 2004. See also: Princeton Study, “A Case Analysis of
Kakuma,” 38: approximately 3,000 young Sudanese females arrived in Kakuma refugee
camp along side the ‘lost boys’. Those females, who were unaccompanied, lived with
foster families. Many “functioned more as domestic servants than as daughters. . . . The
girls [were] viewed as a source of income for the families, through their additional rations
and dowry they [brought] to the family when they [were] forced to marry other Sudanese
men.”; Grabska, “Lost Boys, Invisible Girls,” 485: “In the USA between 1990 and 1997
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621 miles northwest of Nairobi. Kakuma is in an extremely remote, marginalized and
most inhospitable region of Kenya. Kakuma’s climate is semi-arid, in that it is humid,
yet receives minimal to no precipitation, with average temperatures of 104 degrees
Fahrenheit. The camp presents a harsh, windswept environment that supports little more
than dehydrated thorn scrub and a smattering of Acacia trees.5 When it does rain, the
cracked red earth turns to torrents of flowing mud making roads impassable for weeks on
end. Nonetheless, by 1993, Kakuma hosted 40,000 refugees, and by 2003, 95,000
displaced persons occupied the camp.6 At the time of this writing, Kakuma is “home” to
86,251 refugees.7
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others having come from Sudan, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
“By September 2011, Dadaab had received more than 140,000 new refugees,
predominantly Somalis. The refugee population reached 450,000, further stretching
infrastructure and services far beyond the original intended capacity of the three camps in
Dadaab of a total of 90,000 refugees. . . . By September, the overall population of
refugees and asylum-seekers [individuals who claim to be refugees, but whose claim has
not been definitively evaluated] in Kenya, including 52,000 people of concern [internally
displaced persons, stateless persons or others that are a concern to the UNHCR] in
Nairobi, stood at some 559,000 people.”
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Kakuma Refugee Camp is wedged between two usually dry riverbeds: those of
the Tarach and Lokadet Rivers. The camp itself is located approximately 1.25 miles from
and the town of Kakuma. It is, roughly speaking, 12 miles long and 2.5 miles wide.8
It is divided into five sections:9 Kakuma I is the oldest and largest, established in 1992 to
encamp the ‘lost boys’ of Sudan. This section is comprised of predominantly Sudanese.
“Kakuma II was opened primarily for Somali refugees who were relocated from camps in
Mombasa.”10 In 1999, Kakuma III was opened to accommodate additional flows of
Sudanese refugees along with other nationals seeking refuge. Since then, Kakuma IV
and V have opened to accommodate additional incoming refugees from various
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Princeton Study, “A Case Analysis of Kakuma,” 18.
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Meredith Hunter, "The Failure of Self-Reliance in Refugee Settlements," University of
Leeds, POLS Journal 2 (Winter 2009): 22: The layout of refugee camps ignores the
needs of refugees, “everything from the layout to the size of the plots of land for
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the socio-political, environmental and demographic realities of individual refugee crises.”
Hunter cites: Manuel Herz, Refugee Camps in Chad Planning Strategies and the
Architect's Involvement in the Humanitarian Dilemma (Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR,
Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2007), 22: The standardized plan “starts
with the tent or the refugee family as the smallest basic unit. […] This unit of the family
is organized into camp clusters (16 tent), camp blocks (16 clusters), camp sectors (4
blocks) and finally the complete camp (4 sector), which is ‘ideal’ case houses 20,000
refugees.”
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2009). (Hereafter cited as: Ayiemba), 8.
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nation-states in conflict. Currently, the camp is comprised of Sudanese, Somalis,
Ethiopians, Ugandans, Rwandans, Congolese, Burundians and Eritreans.11
G. P. Opata described the camp of Kakuma as essentially an urban settlement,
which lacks proper planning and foresight to address safety, security, comfort or
conveniences. “There are no facilities such as proper access roads, toilets, open spaces,
drainage channels etc. This makes the camp have the appearance of large slum congested
with people with no proper amenities.”12
“Dirt roads and paths separate the camp into different zones and groups, which
are usually divided based on nationality.”13 There are no vehicles allowed in the camp
other than those of the UNHCR and other agencies. There are small businesses
throughout Kakuma, but consumer access to goods is limited because the camp is
extremely isolated, the only customers being other refugees, NGO staff and local
Kenyans. Opata and Singo found that the most notable and basic types of businesses
found in Kakuma are small-scale retail shops:
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Refugee Camp (Jerusalem: International Research and Advisory Panel (IRAP), 1998),
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These sell basic commodities such as salt, sugar, tea-leaves, paraffin,
cooking fat and so on. The shops also stock most of the food ration items
such as maize and beans issued to refugees by the UNHCR and her
implementing agencies. It was found that some refugees, particularly
women, are engaged in the brewing and selling of illicit liquor.14
Kakuma’s isolated location, its ethnic composition, and the terms and conditions
by which refugees are constrained are the result of changes in Kenyan government
policies enacted during the year before the boys arrived there. Prior to 1991, Kenya’s
total refugee population was estimated to be 15,000.15 “However, at the height of the
refugee influx in 1991 that resulted from the collapse of Somalia and the fall of the
Ethiopian government, the number of refugees rose drastically to an estimated 370,000 to
700,000.”16 Until 1991, the Government of Kenya (GoK) allowed refugees to move
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Grephas Opata and Stephen M. Singo, The Economics of Displacement: A Study of the
Changing Gender Roles, Relations, and its Impact on the Livelihood and Empowerment
of Women Refugees in Kenyan Camps (Eldoret, Kenya: Moi University Press, 2004).
(Hereafter cited as: Opata and Singo, The Economics of Displacement), 20. See also:
Crisp. “Forms and Sources of Violence,” 69: It is thought that only 15 percent of refugees
have a source of income apart from the assistance they receive. Additionally see: Opata
and Singo, The Economics of Displacement, 48: “The main source of livelihood for
refugees is food rations from donor agencies. The food ration basket has been
diminishing gradually, due to reduction in donor funding, with the result that currently,
the ration basket is inadequate in quantity, quality and variety.”
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John Burton Wagacha and John Guiney, “The Plight of Urban Refugees in Nairobi,
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freely throughout the country, legally work and pursue educations. The integration of
refugee populations into Kenyan society had seemed workable. However:
Fear of insecurity and instability permeated government circles in Kenya
as a consequence of major domestic political changes that were occurring.
At the time of the new influx of refugees, Kenya was experiencing
drought and internal unrest accompanied by cries for a multiparty system,
growing tribalism, and increasing corruption. These resulted in a
withdrawal of donor funding and increased demands by the World Bank
and the international community for greater accountability, transparency,
and freedom of the press.17
Initially, the GoK had been charged with refugee status determination, while the
UNHCR assumed observational and advisory roles. An Eligibility Committee
determined refugee status, which was mainly adjudicated individual cases. The refugee
status determination process came under pressure as civil conflict heightened in Uganda
in the mid-1980s, and later in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The system collapsed under
the weight of the staggering refugee flows of the early 1990s, at which point the Kenyan
Government delegated authority for the management and protection of refugees within
Kenyan borders to the UNHCR:18

17

John Burton Wagacha and John Guiney, “The Plight of Urban Refugees in Nairobi,
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Committee.”; Karen Jacobsen, "Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and
African Statebuilding,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 4 (December
2002). (Hereafter cited as: Jacobsen, “Can Refugees Benefit the State?”): 594, Footnote
9: “The [host] state usually enters a tripartite agreement with UNHCR and an
implementing agency that carries out relief operations in the camps. To ensure nominal
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In order to attract sufficient external resources to cope with the material
needs of the Sudanese and the Somalis, the Kenyan government began to
acquiesce in the conventional approach of putting refugees in camps, and
provided the land for these establishments.19
The burgeoning influx of refugees in the 1990s yielded the creation of 15 camps
throughout Kenya, which were later consolidated, to four: Mombasa and Dadaab to host
Somali refugees; Mandera for those fleeing Ethiopia, and Kakuma for the lost boys from
Sudan.20 A further 13 closures and consolidations occurred between 1994-1997, when
the GoK decided to close all but two refugee camps, Kakuma and Dadaab, which were
the most isolated of all.21
Under current laws, individual asylum seekers must register with the Refugees
Commissioner in Kakuma, Dadaab or Nairobi within 30 days of arrival in Kenya.

control of camps by the state, supervisory personnel such as the camp commandant are
government officials.”
19

Verdirame, 57.
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Verdirame, 68-69: Under Kenyan law, business carried out within refugee camps are
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Once registered, a ‘waiting slip’ is issued. It is valid for a year, or until a decision has
been rendered on the asylum claim. Within that year, a Refugee Status Determination
interview is held with the individual applicant. Once the interview occurs, a report is
forwarded to the commissioner with a decision to be rendered in 90 days. If refugee
status is granted, a UNHCR Mandate Refugee Certificate of Protection Letter is issued.
If the asylum request is rejected, an appeal is allowed. However, an appealed rejection is
final, requiring the asylum seeker leave Kenya. If the request is granted, the applicant is
taken to a UNHCR camp.
Under Kenyan encampment policy, no registered refugees may leave, travel or
move outside their assigned camps without special permission to do so.22 The GoK
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Gerry Simpson, Meghan Rhoad, and Agnes Odhiambo, "Welcome to Kenya": Police
Abuse of Somali Refugees. (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch. 2010). (Hereafter
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because there is no list,”) for warranting a ‘movement pass’ are for medical issues,
educational purposes, and resettlement or humanitarian considerations. See also:
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policy restricting refugee movement is illegal under the 1951 Refugee Convention,
however.23
Kenyan government policy requires refugees to live within one of two refugee
camps, either Kakuma or Dadaab.24 Kakuma is unenclosed by any form of fencing or
outside barriers, allowing both local non-refugees and the indigenous population of
Turkana tribesmen free access to the camp at any time, for any reason.25 The UN/NGO
compound, which operates within the perimeters of a 6pm to 6am curfew, is located
about two-thirds of a mile from the nearest confines of the camp and is fortified by
multiple layers of fencing topped with rolls of razor wire. The UN prohibits UNHCR or
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other NGO workers from living outside the camp itself.
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The Catholic Order,

Salesians of Don Bosco, is the only NGO that chooses to ignore this directive and resides
within the camp.27 Although unfenced, Kakuma is commonly described as “a prison
without walls.”
The relationship between the UNHCR and the Kenyan government has created a
host of problems for both the refugees living in the camp and the local population
surrounding the camp. For example:
In Kakuma, refugees are not allowed to keep animals, since this is likely
to increase conflict between the refugees and the local Turkana People. . . .
It is possible for refugees to start small businesses, if the capital is
available (either through a loan from an NGO or with money sent by
family abroad). However, the market is finite because Kakuma is in a very
isolated area and the majority of customers are other refugees, a small
26

Abebe Feyissa and Rebecca Horn, “There is More than One Way of Dying: An
Ethiopian Perspective on Refugee Camps,” in Hollenbach, 24: “The UNHCR compound
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UNHCR staff. However, in practice, the field posts are frequently not staffed, and when
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ever hope to serve.”
27

United Nations Security Coordinator, “Security in the Field: Information for Staff
Members in the United Nations System.” United Nations. New York, (1998): 9-11: “The
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number of NGO staff, and local Kenyans. All NGOs in the camp
“employ” refugees, but due to Kenyan laws prohibiting employment of
refugees, they are engaged on a voluntary basis and then paid an
“incentive,” which is far lower than a wage would be for a Kenyan in an
equivalent job.28
Kakuma Refugee Camp is known:
. . . for high degrees of communal, inter-communal and sexual violence.
Tense relations between the refugee and host communities, exacerbated by
competition over scarce resources and local perceptions of neglect by
national and international authorities, have led to the targeting of refugee
businesses and households by bandits. In the absence of strong police and
judicial systems, acts of robbery and violence perpetuated against refugees
go unpunished.29
In both Kakuma and Dadaab, “the rule of law is weak and the perpetrators of violence are
rarely held accountable for their actions.”30
Violence is endemic. As Jeff Crisp suggests, “it is impossible to quantify the
amount of violence which takes place in and around Kenya’s refugee camps,” however, it

28

Ron J. Eidelson and Rebecca Horn, "Who Wants to Return Home? A Survey of
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can be stated with relative certainty that violence occurs on a regular basis, both on
collective and individual levels.31 According to one UNHCR official in Kenya,
“you cannot create an island of security in a sea of insecurity.”32 It is a statement that
neatly encapsulates the difficulties experienced by UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations working in the country’s refugee camps. Jacobsen explains, “Camps do not
solve security problems. They are in fact added sources of instability and insecurity . . .
because they aggravate existing security problems and create new ones.” 33 As stated by
a UNHCR security official in Kenya, “The large and sprawling nature of the camps in
Kenya means that they fail to provide refugees with a “defensible space.””34
On a collective level, as Crisp suggests, the patterns of conflict can be analyzed in
one of three ways. First, violent clashes have been noted amongst refugees of the same
sub-clans or nationality, such as Sudanese Dinka and Sudanese Nuers. It has also
occurred between national groups, such as Sudanese and Somalis, or Sudanese Nuers and
Ethiopians. Thirdly, violent conflicts occur between refugees and local populations, such
as those between refugees and local Turkanas. Collisions between refugees and Turkanas
groups are constant:
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This is partly due to the steady expansion of the refugee camp into areas
used by the Turkana for grazing, and partly because of a growing tendency
for local Turkana to settle within the perimeter of the camp, where they
are more likely to come into contact and conflict with the refugees.35
In Kakuma, the refugee population far exceeds the indigenous population. That,
combined with the political and economic marginalization of Turkanas, has resulted in
deep tensions between these two populations. Additionally, it is well understood that
refugees at Kakuma and Dadaab, as marginal as their diets may be, are generally better
off than the local population on whose land the camps have been put. The Turkana suffer
higher rates of malnutrition than the refugees.36 The IRIN reported in July 2011,
“Turkana has experienced malnutrition rates of up to 37.4 percent; the highest recorded in
20 years and more than double the UN World Health Organization (WHO) emergency
threshold of 15 percent.”37 Tension between the camp population and the Turkana is
heightened through the proliferation of weapons throughout the region, which has added
to the civil unrest.38
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Grabska. In-Flux: (Re)negotiations of Gender, 175: The mere presence of the Camp
complicated by the fact of the lack of resources creates an economic interdependency
between the Turkanas and refugees. “Many, including children work as servants for
refugee households while others sell water, firewood and alcohol. Some younger girls
and women offer sexual services to the predominantly male refugee population. . . . Some
Ethiopians narrated stories of sexual services provided by these children for as little as 20
KSh ($0.30) or in exchange for food.”
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Further, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has also been known to
contribute to the collective violence of Kakuma. Crisp explains, “that the SPLA imposes
taxes on the Sudanese refugee population but little is known about the degree of physical
or psychological coercion involved in these processes.”39 What is more clearly
understood is that Kakuma is “strongly influenced by the SPLA, which plays an
important role in the selection of community leaders and hence the administration of the
camp. Kakuma provides recruits (and possibly conscripts) for southern Sudan’s rebel
forces.40 Additionally, militarization of camp and military recruitment both inside and
outside the camp occurs and even if UNHCR officials discover an armed individual or
group, UNHCR officials have no mandate to disarm individuals or militias.41
Pini argues that:
In and around Kakuma and Dadaab, the rule of law is weak and the
perpetrators of violence are rarely held accountable for their actions.
39

Crisp, "A State of Insecurity,” 603.

40

Ibid., 623. See also: Reuer, 7: In an interview given May 1998, an intern who worked
for UNHCR and LWF stated: “Last year, around 5,000 [Sudanese minors] were taken
from Kakuma refugee camp to the war front, where most of them died. The type of
clothing found on their dead bodies, enable them to be traced to this camp. Because
Kakuma is located so close to the Sudanese border, commanders of different rebel forces
will often enter the camp. They meet with community leaders from the camp, who are
required to produce a certain number of youths, based upon where the fighting is
happening. The boys have no choice other than to obey their elders, if they don’t wish to
be outcast from the society. They have absolutely no control over their futures.”;
Grabska, In-Flux: (Re)negotiations of Gender, 138: “It should be noted that Kakuma
camp was famous as a retreat place for high-ranking SPLA officers. In fact, many of
them sent their families to the camp for protection and education and would visit them
occasionally during their ‘holidays’ from the military campaigns.”
41

Pini. “Political Violence and the African Refugee Experience,” International Affairs
Review (2007). (Hereafter cites as: Pini): 5.

63
This security shortage has catalyzed the formation of very powerful
rebel groups within the refugee camps who destabilize not only the areas
around the camps, but also entire border areas in both Sudan and Somalia
as well.42
Quantifying individual levels of violence in Kakuma is difficult. Individuals,
specifically women, are often reluctant to report abuse for fear of retaliation by the
perpetrators or of rejection by their families and community. Rape is widespread, and
carries with it strong cultural stigma. “[Females] who acknowledge being raped may be
ostracized, isolated, or even punished by their husbands and families.” 43
Furthermore, the economic, political and social marginalization of males in
Kakuma often leads to feelings that they can no longer provide for their families.
“A man’s inability to fulfill the traditional ‘provider’ role was said to contribute to
feelings of anger and shame, which were perceived to manifest themselves in violence.”44
Much of this hostility is directed toward women.
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“Security and maintenance of law and order within the refugee camps” is the
responsibility of the host nation-state.45 Although the UNHCR has the mandate to protect
refugees, it can only operate in:
. . . a country with the consent of the government and the ultimate
protection of refugees still rests on the shoulders of the host
government . . . it is [the host government’s] laws and regulations which
set the immediate standards for protection; and it is their officials who are
tasked with implementing them. . . . In fact, the main threat to the
protection of refugees often emanated from states themselves.46
It is at this juncture that the differences between the post-World War II
circumstances that resulted in the creation of the UNHCR and its mandate and mission
clash with contemporary African realities. The UNHCR camps created in Europe were
designed to relocate populations to pre-existing nations whose peoples identified with
and included themselves in and according to historically based national, cultural and

Ethiopian refugee himself writes, “There are only bodies in Kakuma. Everyone’s souls
are traveling.”
45
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Ayiemba, 2.

Veney, 168. For detailed discussion and documentation of security abuses and human
rights violations perpetrated against Kenyan refugees see, Simpson, Rhoad, and
Odhiambo, "Welcome to Kenya": Police Abuse of Somali Refugees. (New York, NY:
Human Rights Watch. 2010). See also: Jacobsen. "Can Refugees Benefit the State?" 592:
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towards refugees on its territory. This suggests that as long as a host state allows refugees
to cross its borders, no matter how inadequate the protection it offers, the host state
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often linguistic pasts. The refugees saw themselves in terms of a common culture and
history, whatever the dimensions of their identity. They returned to environments into
which they would reintegrate and be accepted. Their cultural roots were, in a sense,
unchallenged by the vagaries of World War II. It was a question of creating the
platforms whereby the diverse populations trapped in circumstances consequent to a brief
disruption in political stability could be reunited with their compatriots. Their basic
needs, until their relocation could be accomplished, had to be met. They had to be fed,
housed, educated, and serviced medically until they could be relocated to their ancestral
homes, their historical nation-states. Within a few years, the process of relocation was
completed.

That was not the situation in Africa. Sudan, as a nation, had not existed

until 1956, and its complex ethnic, cultural, racial, religious and political history did not
predispose a European sense of national identity. Nor was it alone in that: neither did
circumstances in Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Chad, Rwanda, or most modern African
nation-states, prior to their creation. Colonial empires, leaving the newly independent
nations to forge their own identities, drew their borders. Sudan and Kenya have been two
among many to try, but precious few have succeeded.
Kenya includes forty-some ethnicities, while Sudan has hundreds. That it is
difficult to integrate Islamic, Christian, and traditional African cultures should not be
surprising, either in Sudan or Kenya. In Sudan, the colonial realities were shaped by
European considerations.
Kenya was left in a similar predicament, at independence, with Kikuyu
domination. Sudan achieved independence in 1956, as a Muslim-dominated reality
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focused on Khartoum, Islamization and Arabization. Since then, both countries have
struggled with nation-building in their own distinct ways and have been less than
successful. South Sudan became the newest African nation-state after struggling for
inclusion for more than four decades, the bulk of which were spent in civil war.
Kenya, despite its economic successes has also been periodically engulfed by civil strife
since independence, even if to a lesser degree. Since 1991 it has been host to a massive
numbers of refugees, who came in greater numbers than could be assimilated.
The UNHCR began its efforts in Kenya with the same objectives as in post-war
Europe: to provide humanitarian relief in the form of housing, food, medical support and
education for refugees until they could be relocated to their post-conflict national
homelands. But conflict in the Horn of Africa has never ceased. Currently Dadaab
houses the greatest number of refugees in the world - with little hope of immediate
repatriation. The average length of stay in a protracted refugee setting such as Kakuma is
17 years.47 The UNHCR struggles to manage Kakuma with a staff of fewer than
three dozen to tend to the needs of some 86,000 refugees. Further, global governmental
donations to UNHCR have slowed in recent years. Understaffed and underfunded, as
well as charged with an untenable mission, the UN must rely on assistance from NGOs to
provide what services it can at Kakuma and other UNHCR refugee camps.
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The opportunities for refugees to work and generate income are extremely
limited, with many traditional functions taken over by UNHCR and partnering
agencies.48 “[The GoK] gives UNHCR permission to work in the country, ship in food
and equipment free of taxes, and provides security in the camp.”49
In Kakuma, the UNHCR is the umbrella organization which:
. . . coordinates protection and assistance efforts, in collaboration with
[the] government of Kenya, UN agencies and others. While most projects
are undertaken by UNHCR implementing partners, certain activities, such
as flight services, refugee transportation and medical evacuations are
directly implemented by UNHCR. There are 20 UNHCR staff (4
international, 13 national and 3 UN volunteers working in of Kakuma).50
UNHCR supervises and coordinates international agencies with which it has contracted.
The main private agencies in Kakuma are Lutheran World Federation (LWF),
World Food Programme (WFP), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Don Bosco and
Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) and Gemeinschaft fur Technologische Zusammenarbeit
(German Development Cooperation), (GTZ).
The LWF “implements camp management activities, including food distribution,
storage and distribution of non-food items, lorry management, education, shelter, water
and sanitation, and community services.”51 Additionally:
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. . . within the camp, LWF has responsibility for security. It employs a
number of Kenyans mainly ex-military personnel, and refugees from the
various national groups resident there. They patrol the camp and all issues
relating to security have to be reported to them. . . . When a case arises in
Kakuma and it is reported to the security, it will be referred, depending on
its gravity, to the UNHCR or to the refugee leaders’ ‘court’. Cases referred
to UNHCR may then be handed over to the Kenyan police. Thus, cases of
theft and assault may be handled either by the Kenyan police of the
refugee leaders.”52
The WFP is responsible for securing and delivering food rations for distribution
twice monthly, and:
. . . works closely with UNHCR in both emergencies and protracted
refugee situations to deliver food to refugee populations. . . . WFP
provides food assistance to refugee populations of 5,000 or more . . .
whereas UNHCR is responsible for the food needs of smaller groups53
The IRC provides health care, shelter, assists in providing clean water, supports
education, job training and runs micro-enterprise development programs. However,
health services are minimal by western standards. Kakuma only has one 120-bed hospital
and four clinics.54
JRS is primarily concerned with equipping refugees with skills, to enable them to
venture into businesses such as carpentry and masonry.55 It also provides micro-finance
loans to assist in the establishment of small businesses.56 Further, JRS runs a protection
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area for women most at risk of violence. “Safe Haven” Protection Center provides
counseling and other services for victims of sexual and gender-based violence. The only
other apparent option for women at risk (i.e. raped, abused or abducted) is the UNHCR
protection area. This is a fenced in area approximately the size of a football field.
Women seeking shelter, along with their children, reside within the confines of this area.
This author has been told that there are women that have lived in this protection area for
years.57
GTZ is an environmental organization that has been active in Kenya on behalf of
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. GTZ focuses
on development projects that reduce adverse impacts on the environment. GTZ is in
charge of the distribution of firewood in the Camp.
All these international agencies, as Horst suggests, “are highly heterogeneous,
and it is therefore quite difficult to form a unified and coherent system of
communication. . . . The main link that binds the different actors together is the aid
itself”.58
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Despite collaboration between the UNHCR and private organizations, the
delivery of services to Kakuma’s diverse population far from adequate. Food supply
services are insufficient,59 as are medical and fuel resources for Kakuma’s inhabitants.
Security services to protect refugees are all but non-existent. Further, living conditions
are abhorrent.
Most dwellings within the camp are minimal to sub-standard. Some are small
abodes with walls made of mud and roofs which are thatched or made from sheets of
corrugated scrap metal or plastic sheeting. Other structures in which individuals reside
are worn tents or nothing more than cardboard boxes pieced together.
The primary source of energy in the camp is firewood which is a supplementary
item distributed by GTZ every other month. Most often, the amount distributed is
insufficient. Refugees must purchase or barter for adequate firewood or charcoal using
food rations, or go without for lengthy periods.60 Locals “cut down trees to either sell as
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firewood or to burn and sell as charcoal. They sell firewood to contractors for agency
distribution in camps.”61
Sanitation is sub-standard. The pit latrines situated throughout the camp are
serviced by trucks dumping sewage in “open wasteland, in the process exposing the local
population to pathogenic microorganisms.”62
Jamal observes that “for people who may have lost all material possessions,
education is the most portable asset, the one most likely to enable the refugee to thrive
upon attainment of a durable solution.”63 Schools, however, are limited in their ability to
provide preparation which would be transportable to other environments, either through
repatriation or relocation to host nation-states outside Africa.
According to international standards, refugees should be protected from criminal
abuse:
In practice, however, powers of arrest, adjudication and punishment
appear to have been assumed by institutions which are indigenous to the
different refugee populations. The ‘traditional judges’ and ‘bench courts’
which characterize the Sudanese community in Kakuma, for example, are
said to wield immense (and somewhat arbitrary) power – including the
power of corporal punishment and detention in a prison facility.64
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Consequently, many crimes go unpunished, or justice is miscarried by the very
oppressors who committed them. The marginalized existence of Kakuma’s refugees
manifest themselves through uncontrollable acts of rape, alcohol dependence, theft,
domestic violence, depression, suicide, murder and psychotic behavior, all of which have
been observed throughout the years at Kakuma. Feyissa and Horn suggest:
The negative psychological effects of living in a refugee camp are
exaggerated further when the stay in the camp is protracted. Not only do
refugees in protracted displacement situations have to cope with prolonged
exposure to the stresses of life in a refugee camp, but also the ongoing
uncertainty about their future.65
However, frequently the dislocation of refugee camp life is an extension of the
trauma of the preceding shocks of war that brought them to refugee camps. In south
Sudan, for instance, invading north Sudanese forces systematically killed all the adult
males, raped females, burned the villages, and committed terrible atrocities involving
children. The very fabric that wove the threads of these patriarchal societies together is
irreparably torn. Among the Dinka, for example, all social institutions were tied to the
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stability of place, traditional “coming of age” rites and practices, the certainty of a
stable family, and an assured succession of generations. These comforts were taken from
the lives of survivors, including young men who could not assume their status as adults;
not being initiated to it in their homelands; denied of the opportunity to establish
themselves as productive marriageable prospects; not knowing whose children the raped
women would bear, even if they were already married. And, it is men who perpetrate
internal sexual and other violent crimes in refugee camps. In Kakuma, “young men are
particularly challenged, as they are at a stage in life where they ought to be finding their
place in society as fathers, husbands, protectors, and providers in short, as men.”66
Life in Kakuma and Dadaab is “constrained in the best of times. For the
disproportionately large numbers of male adolescents, and for others, there are few
salubrious outlets for their energies.”67 Jamal suggests that the:
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. . . loss of role and status may be particularly problematic for males.
Female refugees are often able to maintain their traditional roles and
responsibilities in camps, and so maintain their gender identity, whilst men
are more likely to lose their central roles, especially that of protector and
provider, which makes it difficult to maintain their sense of themselves as
men in the community and family.68
An Ethiopian refugee in Kakuma explained to Feyissa and Horn that “his life in Kakuma
was for him like life in the Dead Sea, where one cannot find a trace of life, where no
natural phenomena exist, where one cannot swim out of it.”69 Refugee camp realities
present an additional particularly pernicious form of culture shock for both males and
females.
International aid agencies often place increased emphasis on women by asking
them:
. . . to participate in decision-making structures, in food distributions and
in training and income generation programs. Women, as a result, may feel
more empowered than previously; men may feel even more emasculated.
As a result of these activities, though, women may be burdened with ever
more responsibilities, and humanitarian agencies need to be cognizant of
women’s often immense workloads before overloading them with
additional tasks.70
Women, though, are perhaps the most victimized of the refugee population, from
the times that the wars made refugees of them, into their circumstances in refugee camps.
concluded that, “the excruciating problem in Kakuma is the “demographic imbalance.””
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Rape as a weapon of warfare is common. Kagwanja suggests that the “rape of girls,
perhaps more than any other act of aggression, exposes the utter defencelessness of the
entire community; it is the exercise of ultimate power and control of one group by
another.”71 As Mertus asserts, rape is a “graphic demonstration of triumph over men who
fail to protect ‘their’ women. . . . In one act of aggression, the collective spirit of women
and of the nation is broken, leaving a reminder long after the troops depart.”72
Uprooted women in camps often find themselves on their own. As a result,
women are forced into new economic and social roles:
The breakdown of community and family structures in Kakuma, together
with the lack of opportunities to generate income to pay dowries were said
to have changed traditional marriage practices in ways that make violence
more likely, and to have disrupted some of the systems that protected
women from violent husbands.73
As a result of civil war and displacement, an unprecedented number of women
find themselves devoid of family. The Dinka and Nuer are lineage societies with
extensive kin networks, but so many males have died that a number of females are
virtually isolated for the first time in their lives.74 Nowrojee suggests, “systems that
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women had formerly relied upon to help address domestic violence – extended
networks of family, neighbors, and community leaders – still exist, but in much weaker,
more compromised, and less reliable forms.”75 “The loss of social support is exacerbated
by the destabilization of communities which typically accompanies displacement.”76
The dynamics of ethnicity contributes to violence against women, particularly in
Kakuma. Kagwanja explains:
Sudanese male refugees and militia assaulted women, especially from the
Dinka group. Sexual assault on Sudanese women revolved around the
customary practices of child-marriage, forced marriage and remarriage.
In the latter case, refugee women are kidnapped and remarried to men in
Southern Sudan who were able to pay huge dowries to the family in the
form of cattle.77
Border crossings are particularly dangerous for women. There are numerous
accounts of women being used as chits in order for other refugees to cross the border, or
those at the border crossings asking for sexual favors in exchange for passage.
“Ironically, when female refugees flee civil wars in their own countries across borders
into neighboring territories, they often find themselves in either a far more insecure
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In the words of one female Somali

refugee, “We ran away from the lion, but we have only found a hyena.”79
Additionally, “displacement can increase the likelihood of cultural norms being
more accepting of violence, and can contribute to shifts in cultural practices which
facilitate violence.”80 “Violence against women is perpetuated not only by men within
the camp, but also by men from the local population who may resent the presence of
refugees, particularly when there is competition for scarce resources.”81
“Even after they make it to a “safe zone,” women and girls are at risk of sexual
assault. Often the perpetrators are the very forces that are supposed to protect them. . . .
Female inhabitants of refugee camps are often forced to trade sex for food rations or
asylum hearings:82
The cost of recovering food rations frequently entails giving sexual
favours to male refugees who are given rations to distribute. Other women
are forced into prostitution in order to obtain adequate food for themselves
and their children, as rations are barely enough.83
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In the end, females’ bodies are often the only currency they have left.84
Kakuma is, in summation, not only an East African and Kenyan or Sudanese, but
an international travesty born of the application of paradigms appropriate to the
circumstances of post-war Europe in the creation of the UNHCR on the one hand, and
their application to the realities of post-independence Africa on the other. The African
“nations” which successively joined the community of the United Nations simply did not
match the universalist definitions of “nation” operative in post-war Europe. But they
were assumed to do so. Hence, it was expected that what had worked so well in the
relocation of European refugees would apply to Africa. Indeed, the human suffering that
occurred as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, resembled that of displaced European
populations. But, Europeans saw themselves as German, Polish, French or Dutch, while
African identities were still based in ethnicities which had been irrelevant to the colonial
powers which had drawn the boundaries of African nations - which had little meaning to
those peoples included in them. There was no Sudanese, no Kenyan, and no Chadian
identity and they are still yet to emerge. The “civil wars” within African nation-states
were misinterpreted to be just that. But they were interethnic in character, a product of
the inclusion of often antipathetic ethnic, religious, and cultural groups joined only by
externally dictated geographic boundaries having nothing to do with African histories or
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cultures. Hence, there was no “Sudan” to which to return after the “civil war” that
displaced so many. Unlike America, Sudan hadn’t the nine decades to determine what
had to be resolved before there was a Sudan. Officially, it already existed. But Britain
left Khartoum never fully addressing the obvious reality that her own administration of
southern Sudan had already recognized the differences between northern and southern
Sudan, culturally, ethnically or politically. Leaving an Arabized, Islamic regime in place
in 1956, the British set the stage for an Islamic and “Arab” regime to integrate a
non-Muslim and traditional African southern Sudan.
According to international law, Kenya’s refugee policies are less than generous,
but from the Kenyan point of view, necessary. Fifteen thousand refugees, before 1991,
could possibly have been absorbed, even into a nation struggling to fully integrate its own
42 ethnicities. But as Kenyan refugee populations swelled consequent to prolonged strife
in the neighboring nations, the GoK had few options. It created refugee camps,
ultimately consolidating them into two: Kakuma and Dadaab, located in remote areas.
And it restricted refugees to those camps while abdicating responsibility for them. Left
with no other viable options, the UN accepted the reality that Kenya could not absorb the
forced migrations of the hundreds of thousands crossing its borders.
In effect, the paradigms embracing Kenya’s early refugee policies shifted
according to African realities. The UN’s did not, placing the UNHCR in the impossible
circumstance of managing what were no longer and still are not relocation camps.
The GoK located both Kakuma and Dadaab in the most remote areas to ensure the least
disruption to its own stability. But Kakuma is located on land that had long been used by
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Turkanas. The GoK could neither restrict, nor enforce restriction of Turkana access to
Kakuma. Further, the UNHCR could not mandate restrictions of its own, having neither
the authority nor the fiscal and human resources to do so. Consequently, it was left to
struggle to provide shelter, food, housing, education and medical services for tens of
thousands at Kakuma with a miniscule staff. But, it had to rely on relatively large-scale
NGOs to assume some of those responsibilities, at times with assistance from smaller,
more specialized organizations. However, the staggering numbers of refugees at Kakuma
alone, not even considering the growing diversity of ethnicities the camp hosted, rendered
a number of services inadequate to meet international standards. Food and fuel shortages
alone predisposed internal struggles among the camp’s population. Medical services
were and are inadequate. The maintenance of order was impossible due to the number
and diversity of refugees. Open to groups such as the Turkana and the SPLA, external
forces work to disrupt any semblance of security. Human rights abuses abound
unpunished for failure of any reliable policing or justice systems. The camp is quite
literally a prison.
To rectify the chaotic circumstances would require not only major paradigm shifts
in international law concerning refugees and UNHCR mandates and radical changes in
international donor nations’ policies, which is unlikely given current economic and
international political circumstances.
For the purposes of this project, Kakuma is therefore not a viable venue wherein
to help displaced women, or any portion of the refugee population. Clearly, that alters
the challenge of creating an NGO to ameliorate the chances for marginalized women and
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their children to reintegrate into their communities considerably. Firstly, this study led
to the realization that in order to help them at all, change had to be effected in the
communities which rejected them, broadening the scope of the original intent of this
project to include those communities. Secondly, it became clear that there had to be a
measure of stability and security in the communities to which they returned. Thirdly, it is
unclear whether South Sudan can provide such and environment. In response to those
realities an approach had to be devised whereby it was possible to include women’s host
communities as beneficiaries to the possible developmental program. It is with these
considerations in mind that the following chapter will address a proposal to accomplish
some degree of reintegration for these women, as well as two alternative proposals should
South Sudan not be stable enough to safely host an NGO.
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CHAPTER 4
REINTEGRATING MARGINALIZED WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN:
A MODEST PROPOSAL

At its inception, this project was focused on what seemed a broad purpose: to
create a non-government organization aimed at rendering African marginalized women
and their children self-sufficient through the acquisition of skills which would provide
them with adequate income to that end. The initial intention was to work in a refugee
camp, addressing the issues confronted by so many who had been displaced because they
had been raped in the course of the twenty-year conflict between northern and southern
Sudan and now were residents of Kakuma Refugee Camp in northern Kenya. With that
purpose in mind, I undertook two trips to Kakuma hoping to make contacts with UNHCR
officials and NGOs operating in that facility. While both trips yielded invaluable
insights, they diminished my hopes of expeditiously and directly meeting the needs of
displaced women in refugee camp settings.
The idea to focus on women in a refugee camp was originally premised on the
success of projects such as those of women in the Liberian camp established near Accra,
Ghana. There, refugees were allowed freedom of movement and the opportunity to
render themselves self-sufficient through the production of items aimed at both Ghanaian
and international markets, yielding sufficient returns to sustain a modicum of prosperity.
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That camp, however, was more ethnically uniform and located in a more stable social
and political venue than Kakuma. Further, it was much smaller and offered the
possibility for refugees to be assimilated into Ghanaian society. In other words, it was a
camp established consistent with United Nations standards for refugee camps. My visits
to Kakuma revealed conditions quite divergent from those in Ghana. Kakuma is host to a
multiplicity of ethnic groups from numerous nation-states in Africa; situated in a hostile
environment; open to intrusions from local and regional influences; and supervised by a
staff charged with the provision of services of an unmanageable scale even just in the
provision of basic survival needs. Regardless of which refugee population in Kakuma is
targeted for aid, there is a common, prohibitive obstacle to successful intervention: that
the traditional social, political, economic and cultural institutions which regulated them
have been severely altered, truncated, or completely eliminated to the extent that the
foundations of family and community have been rendered at best irreparably
dysfunctional, or at worst, self-predatory. When combined with the circumstances of
relocation and the severe restrictions upon all prospects of development in what is
essentially a prison camp, it is clear that there is little possibility for a small NGO to help
resolve women’s plights in Kakuma.
My travel to southern Sudan and the preparation for it did, however, yield some
possibilities for intervention in transitional or post-conflict situations, particularly in the
realm of educational or medicinal challenges to be met there. Even in the course of its
difficult transition to independence, some southern Sudanese have placed a primary
emphasis on the development of schools to educate a largely illiterate population in order
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to prepare for the developmental challenges of the future. A small number of schools
are already operative and well attended. But the sustained success of efforts to build,
staff and operate schools is directly dependent upon the ability of the state to maintain
sufficient civil tranquility to provide a stable venue for the integration of those schools
into the communities which host them. As noted in the second chapter, the challenges
before the Government of South Sudan are great. Mark Mattner notes that, “on average,
countries coming out of war face a 44% chance of relapsing in the first five years of
peace.”2 Essentially South Sudan has emerged from nearly 50 years of civil conflict
among competing regional, religious, ethnic, political and economic entities.
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attended school due to civil conflict. The illiteracy rate among females in South Sudan is
98%. See: http://marolacademysudan.org/ “The Marol Academy” is a 501(C) (3) with the
purpose “of reestablishing schools in rural South Sudan.” The Marol School is the first
project to be undertaken by the Marol Academy.
2

Mark Mattner, “Development Actors and Protracted Refugee Situations: Progress,
Challenges, Opportunties,” in Loescher, Milner, Edward and Troeller, Protracted
Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications, 108. See also:
Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can
Be Done About It. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): Collier suggests that
low-income levels, slow economic growth, stagnation or decline combined with
dependence upon primary commodity exports, such as oil or diamonds, substantially
increases the risk of civil war. The combination of these factors creates what Collier
refers to as a ‘conflict trap’, which increases the likelihood of civil conflict as well as the
recidivism of conflict. See also: Barbara Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability
of Post-Conflict Peace,” World Development Report 2011 – Background Paper
(September 2010): Walter suggests that economic underdevelopment, political conditions
and ethnic and religious fractionalizations are among the principle causes of recidivism in
civil war.
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South Sudan must include and integrate its culturally diverse and ethnically complex
citizenry into the government while at the same time respect both individual and group
identities. As Jok Madut Jok and John Ryle suggest:
The new government in South Sudan and the main government party, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), face a historic choice. One
path they can take is to turn away from the authoritarian habits developed
during the civil war and embrace the principles of an open-society. . . .
This would entail a commitment to accountability, respect for free speech
and promotion of human rights. The other path would be to adhere to the
repressive and autocratic style of politics established by earlier
governments in Sudan, allowing predatory administrative practices and
short-term pursuit of financial gain to entrench themselves, while social
welfare and the conservation of natural resources are neglected, leading to
the establishment of another security state on the Nile. Which path is taken
will determine the fate of a new nation.3
My limited experience at Kakuma, the Rift Valley Institute courses, and the
preponderance of the literature mandate a need for me to readjust my objective to solely
ameliorate the circumstances of marginalized women. Patriarchal kinship systems are at
the social root of the East African political, social and cultural institutions. Hence, as the
Women’s Refugee Commission asserts, “simply targeting women does not guarantee that
they will enjoy increased decision-making power over financial resources, nor does it
address their social and economic marginalization.”4 In order to address women’s needs,
the support of the men who have the power to make decisions affecting the entire
community must be enlisted. It is an indispensible part of the establishment of any
successful developmental program. If the education of females were the goal, it would
3

Jok Madut Jok and John Ryle, “Epilogue: The Next Sudan,” in Ryle et al., The Sudan
Handbook, 187.
4

Women's Refugee Commission, Building Livelihoods: A Field Manual for Practitioners
in Humanitarian Settings (New York: Women’s Refugee Commission, 2009): xvii.
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have to reward the fathers, brothers and uncles as well. In other terms, the goal has to
be integrated into the needs and desires of the community as a whole.
That being the case, it would seem that the establishment of an NGO aimed at
improving the lot of marginalized women would most effectively interlock with either
established schools or medical facilities, or possibly both. There are established
organizations based both in the United States and Africa for which such an NGO might
provide useful programs. Whether this project yields an independent entity, or one that
cooperates with numerous agencies is yet to be determined. Contacts have been made on
both continents. Determining the nature and the mission of this organization will require
a return to East Africa to explore the possibilities based on local needs there. Those will
define the nature and scope of the non-government organization which emerges.
It is difficult to further this narrative in the abstract. Hence, a hypothetical
proposal for a focused, collaborative program put into the context of South Sudanese
reality will follow. Several factors are taken as givens in this scenario:
1. Education is a nationwide priority in South Sudan.
2. Even basic dietary and medical needs are extreme in South Sudan.
3. Relative safety and stability of the host area is assured.
4. Social, political and economic institutions are functional and traditionally
based.
5. There are returning marginalized women with children of undetermined
paternity.
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However, the reasons for local support of education are complex, and not
necessarily tied to the national goal of preparing the South Sudanese population for the
future. For example, while young male students may ultimately benefit directly from
literacy in terms of their participation in the development that may occur, educated girls
may be more of an economic asset to their brothers and uncles who would profit from
their marriage. The attraction to the education of women may well be that they may
bring greater “bride wealth” to their families in that an educated girl may bring greater
returns, for instance. But there is also the reality that there is a premium put on
pre-pubescent girls as marriageable, given greater likelihood of their virginity.5
Thus, this proposal is premature, in that it might well predispose unintended
consequences. Only research “on the ground” can hope to possibly prevent them.
The above is noted to illustrate that the factors included in this modest proposal
are oversimplified, pointing to the need for further fieldwork prior to any effort to
implement it. Nonetheless, the hypothetical will be developed as an example of what
might be done to assist a limited cohort of the female children of repatriated marginalized
women in South Sudan predisposed to their reintegration into local communities via
education.
5

Author’s field notes from Rumbek, Sudan. Based on discussions with Salima Otieno, an
instructor at Loreto Girls Secondary School, June 2010. See also: Jonah Leff,
“Pastoralists at War: Violence and Security in the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region,”
International Journal of Conflict and Violence 3, no. 2 (2009): 192: Chiefs, in interviews,
from Lokichoggio, Kenya in June 2007 explained how the number of livestock given to
the bride’s family is dependent “on the economic status of the groom’s family. Wealthy
families give dowries of up to 300 animals worth [which at the time was] roughly
US$25,000. Many young warriors will raid cattle camps in order to provide large
numbers of cattle to their bride.”
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A Proposal
Firstly, there are a number of schools already operative in South Sudan.
Most require some payment of tuition. While the tuition is minimal measured by western
standards (about US $32.00 annually at Rumbek Senior Secondary School),6 that is a
considerable cost even for the typical villager earning an average-US $984 per year.7
Among the attractions of education for villagers is that children receive noon-time meals.
But, even at those modest rates, repatriated women, being socially and economically
excluded from the communities to which they return cannot afford to send their children
to school.
Secondly, public health conditions in South Sudan are vastly inadequate. Death
rates for children under five years of age are 112 per 1000. Maternal mortality rates are
over 2000 per 100,000 births. Medical help is all but nonexistent. The ratio of physicians
to population is 1 to 500,000.8 The reasons for these statistics are complex, but
fundamentally they are based in the realities of rural life in South Sudan.

6

Tony Calderbank, “Forging a Future in Southern Sudan,” British Council,
(July 9, 2011).
7

Thomas Danielewitz, “South Launches its First GDP Estimate.” The World Bank.
(August 2011). (Hereafter cited as: Thomas Danielewitz): At first sight the GNI /cap
seems far too high considering the conditions on the ground. The estimated GDP/cap of
US$1,546 is “confirmation that the country is rich in oil and natural resources, but has yet
to transform the abundant natural endowments into infrastructure and improved
livelihoods. Export of oil amounts to 71 percent of GDP, and oil revenue accounts for
almost 98 percent of total Government revenue. Income inequality is high (Gini
coefficient is 46), which may explain some of the mismatch, but more importantly,
coming out of civil war and strife, the Government of South Sudan still spends around
one third of the budget on “security and the rule of law.”
8
John Mutenyo, “South Sudan: Time to Focus on Challenges,” The Brookings Institute,
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Water supplies are sub-standard; human waste facilities are usually unsanitary latrines;
food supplies are limited and subject to crop failures due to drought, resulting in chronic
malnutrition; and parasitic infections are rampant due to environmental considerations,
etc.9
But the consequences for this proposal are that there is a significant need for
relatively simple medications - beginning with dietary supplements such as prenatal
vitamins for women; children’s vitamins to offset the effects of poor and insufficient food
supplies; anti-parasitic medications to fight intestinal disorders, and the like.
These products are readily available for little more than the cost of transporting them to
South Sudan.
(February 15, 2011). See also: Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders,
“South Sudan” 2011: “People in South Sudan are at a high risk of contracting: Maleria,
Tuberculosos, Kala azar (visceral leishmaniasis), Dengue fever, Rift Valley fever, Yellow
fever, African trypanosomiasis, Meningococcal meningitis, Rabies, Hepatitis A, B, and
E, and diarrheal diseases such as cholera, dysentery, and typhoid fever.”
9

National Bureau of Statistics for the Republic of South Sudan (2011), (formerly known
as the Southern Sudan Center for Census, Statistics and Evaluation): South Sudan has a
population density of 13/sq. km which is less than one tenth of Uganda, where the density
is 136/sq. km. 83% of South Sudan’s population resides in rural areas with 83% of the
population residing in tukuls. 80% of the population does not have access to any toilet
facility. 38% of the population must walk for more than 30 minutes one-way to collect
drinking water. 50% of the population use firewood or grass as the primary source of
lighting while 96% of the population uses firewood or charcoal as the primary fuel for
cooking. (These statistics are derived from the 2008 Population and Housing Census.);
Thomas Danielewitz discusses the statistical challenges in regard to South Sudan. The
population numbers from the 2008 Census are disputed. The official population of 8.3
million “is probably closer to 9 million.” Additionally, the GDP estimate of US$1,546
was based on “expenditure information, i.e. survey data on household consumption,
government expenditure records, capital investment information, in addition to data in
exports and imports.” Danielewitz suggests that a stronger estimate could be constructed
by estimating GDP from the production side, i.e. by analyzing actual production volumes,
along with values and costs of producers from the major industries in the economy.
The Government of South Sudan hopes to conduct a new Census by 2016.
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Assuming a stable and safe host area, and a functional, traditionally based
community venue to which marginalized women are returning, some description of their
likely circumstances is in order. Returning females face various risk factors during
reintegration, including physical insecurity, food security challenges, gender-based
violence, lack of male and community support systems, and the absence of economic and
educational opportunities. Further, they are often faced with abuse, exploitation and
discrimination upon return.10
Helping these women directly through an NGO aimed solely at enabling them to
become economically self-sustaining would only serve to distance them further from the
communities into which they are denied total re-entry. Such action would seem to yield
only greater rejection of not only the women themselves, but the organization which
helped them. A less direct way of reaching them might be to help their offspring by
association through an already accepted developmental institution: a school.
As a local Boise organization has demonstrated, the delivery of medications to
impoverished rural communities can be accomplished very effectively through schools.11

10

Dale Buscher, Displaced Women and Girls at Risk Factors, Protection Solutions and
Resource Tools (New York, N.Y.: Women's Commission for Refugee Women and
Children, 2006): 28.
11

D.O.E.R.S (Dominican Oversees Education and Relief Society) is a locally based NGO
whose mission is to “help kids to grow up to be healthy and strong” through clean water,
the killing of parasites, maternal health and child nutrition programs. A recent trip to
Honduras in October 2011 resulted in the distribution of $160,000 worth of
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. Included in those supplies were 58,000 doses of
dewormimg medicine and 3.2 million prenatals which benefitted approximately 80,000
individuals. Due to previously established partnerships the actual cost of the medicines
and supplies for this trip totaled approximately $2000.00. For additional information on
D.O.E.R.S see: http://www.doersmissions.org/
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The students themselves can distribute necessary food supplements, including prenatal
and children’s vitamins, as well as anti-parasitical medications to their families, rendering
the school a distribution center. A barrier to the inclusion of the children of marginalized
women’s attendance in South Sudanese schools is the poverty of those women. If tuition
and related costs (uniforms, etc.) were to be absorbed by the school and paid, instead,
through a sort of ‘work study program’ accessible to the children of those women and
those of needier members of the community, a certain number of the students could work
as the distributors of prenatal vitamins to children with expectant mothers, sisters or
aunts. Children’s vitamins could be supplied to sisters and brothers of attending students.
And, anti-parasiticals for all could be delivered as needed. The work would pay off their
tuition obligation. This would make the school accessible to children of members of the
community and those of marginalized women. At the school, perhaps this would foster
an atmosphere of acceptance of the socially marginalized child, while perhaps raising the
acceptance-level for the mother. There might also be opportunity to use the mother in
some capacity, such as helping cook the noon-time meal, or performing some other
function associated with the NGO securing the pharmaceuticals. Established schools, by
virtue of their educational function and because they feed children do have certain social
leverage.
An NGO which came to serve the community by providing the means to reduce
malnutrition and provide relief from parasitical diseases as well as other minor universal
health issues through the distribution of antibiotics, for instance, might gain enough
community support to serve as a vehicle of greater acceptance of those who deliver it.
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Clearly this is all speculation, but it serves as an example of the sort of program
which could serve to integrate the whole community. The decision to distribute
medications would have to include consensus on the part of the host community and
therefore include heads of family and village councils and elders. In the process, it would
open doors for those who were delivering the services, including the targeted women,
their children and the NGO involved. Perhaps one of the most effective ways to assist
socially and economically marginalized repatriated females is to partner with already
functioning schools and programs in an attempt to address needs which have already
been identified in relatively successful venues. The need for food supplements and
antibiotics is clear.
There are four potential schools already known to the author in South Sudan
where partnerships may be possible. Two are in Rumbek, one being a secondary school
for girls, and the other, a secondary school whose students are primarily male.12
The third school is in Marol, while the fourth is located in Marial Bai. Should the
situation in South Sudan be too volatile for effective intervention by an NGO, there are
two additional possible partnerships at the time of this writing: the Turkana Indigenous
Youth to Youth Programme, which is based in Lodwar Kenya, approximately 65 miles
from Kakuma, and the Nsumba orphanage two hours southwest of Kampala, Uganda.

12

(Rumbek is located in the Lakes State in the Bah Al-Ghazal Province in central South
Sudan. It is approximately 235 miles NW of Juba, South Sudan’s Capitol. As of 2011, the
United Nations estimated the population of Rumbek to be 32,100.)
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Primarily a boarding facility, the Loreto Girls Secondary School, with its
average enrollment of 55-60, is located five miles from Rumbek’s town center on the
road to Wau.13
Due to early marriages, girls often times must abandon their educations.
A member of the teaching staff explained that, there are few economic opportunities for
females in the Lakes State, due to high rates of economic and developmental
marginalization, combined with strong provincial beliefs. Therefore, females, in her
opinion, would benefit from learning skill sets that could be applied either by a married
female at home, or be useful to a socially and economically marginalized female.
Skills such as sewing, tailoring or baking sweets were discussed as possible examples of
what might be marketable in Rumbek and throughout the region.14 At this facility, an
NGO might address both this possibility and the distribution of basic medications.
The second prospect is Rumbek Senior Secondary School (RSSS), with an
enrollment of 1500 males and 50 females as of July 2011. Yearly tuition at RSSS is
20 Sterling Pounds, which is the equivalent to about $32.00US.
The Rumbek Senior Secondary School’s needs are many. Much of the school’s
infrastructure is in need of attention due to either damage resulting from years of civil
13

The Roman Catholic Order of, Sisters of Loreto from Ireland, run the Loreto Girls
School Secondary School. For information see the Loreto Girls School Secondary School
website: http://www.loreto.ie/rumbek/112-rumbek. At the time of the author’s visit to
Rumbek in June 2010, 49 girls were enrolled. Annual tuition at that time was 800
Sudanese pounds or approximately $300.00US.
14

As of June 2010, all tailored items and baked sweets had to be brought in from
Kampala, Uganda or Nairobi, Kenya. Kampala is roughly 720 miles to the west of
Rumbek while Nairobi is approximately 1,125 miles to the east.
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war or from a long-standing lack of funding and resources. Classrooms, toilet
facilities, books, school supplies, food, fuel for the generator, and the provision of
security on school grounds are all needed. Additionally, access to sustainable funding for
teaching salaries is of monumental concern.15 In fact, student riots broke out in August
2011 as a response to the unsatisfactory conditions in RSSS. At issue were the extreme
shortages noted above and the lack of qualified teachers. As a result of the riots, RSSS
closed for five months and reopened January 2012. Meeting any one or more of their
immediate needs could be combined with medications to shape the mission of an NGO.
The third institution, Marol School, is located in a village of the same name in the
Warrap State of South Sudan. Founded in 2008, Marol School is the only fully
functional school in an area with a population of 700,000 people. Originally, Marol
School was to be a school solely for girls. On the first day however, only boys came to
register. As a result, the school is now “an all girls school with boys” with a current
enrollment of over 600 students.16 Emphases, along with academic achievement, are:
1. HIV/AIDS and public health awareness, particularly as it relates to female
health issues.
2. Ecological and sustainable environmental training.
3. Non-violent, peaceable conflict resolution within and between communities.
15

When the author attended the 2010 Rift Valley Course on Sudan, dozens of students
had to stand outside of their classrooms and listen through the barred windows as their
teachers taught, due to overcrowded classrooms. As stated in the field notes of the author:
In June 2010, RSSS teachers explained to the author that the teaching staff was in their
5th month of having received no pay for their services.
16

Jok Madut Jok’s description of Marol School clearly illustrates the importance of being
both flexible and adaptable. Although the school is co-educational, attention is given
providing an environment that is, “accessible and safe for girls.” There are students at
Marol School that walk up to 11 miles each way to school.
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Tuition to attend Marol School “is maintained by public subscription and
community support until such time as the fledgling government of South Sudan is in a
position to take over its administration. Fees may be introduced if the recovering local
economy permits so.”17 Still struggling financially, it might be a promising prospect for
the dispensation of medications as a principal mission for an NGO partnering with it.
The final school to be discussed is Marial Bai Secondary School located in the
village of Marial Bai in the Northern Ghazel State of South Sudan. Having opened in
May 2009, it is the region’s first ever secondary school which serves 500 students during
the day and in the evening, offers adult literacy classes. The founder, Valentino Achak
Deng, resided in Marial Bai until he was forced to flee as a result of the Second Civil
War, becoming one of the many lost boys. Since its inception, a teacher’s training
college, a public library, dormitories, a sports facility and community center have been
brought to various stages of completion. Additionally, microfinance opportunities are
now available to local community members through Valentino Achak Deng’s
Foundation.18 It, too, seems a likely partner for a medically oriented effort, especially
given that some of its students are adult members of the community.

17

The Marol Academy, “Aims and Management.”
http://marolacademysudan.org/pages/aimsandmanagement.html
18

The Valentino Achak Deng Foundation states that, “the Foundation will administer a
limited number of micro-loans to local people who demonstrate the skills necessary to
establish and maintain a small business. The Foundation made its first loan to a local
carpenter who recently returned from the refugee camps in Kenya. Forced to leave his
tools behind in Kenya, he needed some small financial assistance to purchase new tools
and open a shop. He and future loan recipients will receive small business training in
order to maximize their economic potential.” See: http://www.valentinoachakdeng.org
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Although each school is unique in regard to locale, gender ratios and
composition of teaching staff, they all share many of the same challenges. All are in need
of sustainable access to and supply of textbooks, learning materials and food. All have
security needs to be addressed along with financial sustainability issues. All need buy-in
from the local community. All must be able to both attract and retain teachers and all
have health care issues in one form or another. It is these needs on which I would like to
focus.
An alternative to the above-mentioned programs, Turkana Indigenous Youth to
Youth Programme (TIYY) is a Christian based non-profit program that targets socially
and economically marginalized females. The mission of the TIYY program is to:
reach out and help the needy destitute girls of the age bracket 10yrs -16yrs
achieve their full potential by equipping them with desirable education and
skills to enable them [to] tackle effectively their future challenges of life in
terms of illiteracy and unemployment.19
The driving force behind this program is Niva Lopetet. Ms. Lopetet’s program
focuses on young females whose parents and families have abandoned them; who do not
have access to education or support; who have suffered domestic abuse, or forced into
early marriages which have interfered with their health and development. TIYY needs
are also sustainable access to funding and supplies. Security is an issue, as is
reintegration into the local community which has marginalized them. The challenge is to
bring funding to the efforts of the TIYY to provide its protégées with the means to sustain
themselves by learning a marketable skill such as the making of clothing. That will

19

“ Turkana Indigenous Youth to Youth Programme” brochure.
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require start-up funds to buy equipment and materials, as well as to create a base of
sustainable funding to continue the effort as new cohorts of marginalized young women
join the ranks of the organization. Whether this is done through micro-loans, or through
exogenous organizations will need further exploration. Again, however, there are
possibilities to combine the dispensation of medicines with the mission of the TIYY as
vehicles of reintegration of marginalized young women into their communities.
The final project to be mentioned is the Nsumba Orphanage, which is located
two hours southwest of Kampala in Nsumba, Uganda. The orphanage serves over 600
children, ages 22 months to 22 years of age. Approximately 450 students reside in
Nsumba Orphanage while the remainder are local children who are enrolled in the
orphanage’s school. Supported by the Kampala Catholic Diocese and managed by the
Ggogomya Sisters, the needs are many. A medical team from the United States visits the
orphanage several times a year providing basic medical care while focusing on the
treatment of HIV/AIDS and other pertinent health-care issues. Expanded access to a
variety of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and vitamin supplements could greatly assist
those individuals already working on the ground. Possibly an opportunity has arisen to
form such a partnership. Further research is needed and will focus on Ugandan Health
Ministry laws and restrictions.
The brief listing of the possibilities for the creation of an NGO to ameliorate the
circumstances of East African communities above is clearly preliminary – the result of
two short investigative trips to the Horn of Africa, two short but intensive courses offered
by the Rift Valley Institute, and volumes of reading in preparation for this project, which
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was meant to lay the groundwork for the establishment of an organization meant to
reintegrate marginalized women into their communities by rendering them economically
self-sufficient in ways that would predispose that re-entry. But it represents a virtual
odyssey, a long journey through a turbulent sea of shifting perspectives. Mere arrival at
Kakuma, three years ago confirmed that the UNHCR’s mission in Africa represented an
application of paradigms inconsistent with African realities. But these were not and are
not likely to shift. Delving deeper into the literature also implicated a corrupt Kenyan
Government, which abrogated its responsibility to protect and assimilate refugees,
allowing them freedom of movement and participation in the Kenyan economy. But the
acceleration of chaos in surrounding nation-states brought staggering numbers of
refugees, leaving the government no option but to keep receiving fleeing populations who
had no hope of repatriation, but to render them the responsibility of the United Nations,
lest they undermine the fragile stability of the Kenyan people. There was no other
possibility but to limit refugees to camps located where they would have the least impact.
The prospect of helping women, or any group in the chaotic environment of Kakuma
through the establishment of a modest NGO evaporated in the heat of this socially arid
environment.
The camp, however did underscore the significance of much of my reading
concerning the necessity of the inclusion of stable functioning social institutions in any
developmental plan. The plight of women could not be addressed unless their host
community acceded to that effort. Hence, the metaphorical winds directing my voyage
turned my emphases toward more stable, transitional and post-conflict venues. And as
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Sarah Michael emphasized, “to be sustainable, development has ultimately to be
controlled by those most concerned and affected.”20
When I arrived in southern Sudan to attend my second Rift Valley Course in the
summer of 2010, which met in a classroom of Rumbek Senior Secondary School, my
odyssey was about to come full circle. Meeting in that sparsely equipped venue
underscored the fundamental poverty of the physical conditions of the African
educational environment. But the Rumbek school was a success, despite the austere
conditions. Crammed into a room that felt crowded for the sixty instructors and students
in the Rift Valley Course, were 150 eager Sudanese students. More students assembled
outside the barred windows, straining to hear what their teachers had to say. The success
of the school was clearly locally driven.
I had considered meeting the needs of schools at the outset of this project.
They had been among the success stories throughout Africa. The Peace Corps had built
many through the years, many of which succeeded, but some of which failed.21
But my perspective on them was premised on a centralized, universalist conviction that
education was yearned for in Africa. The schools that succeeded in southern Sudan did
so because their communities supported them. This humble destination of my journey
pointed to the best way to play a minor role in the amelioration of the circumstances of
20

Sarah Michael, Undermining Development: The Absence of Power Among Local NGOs
in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2004): 130.
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For discussion on failed projects see: Courtney Keene, “Development Projects that
Didn’t Work: The Perils of Narrow Approaches to Complex Situations,” Globalhood Development Across Disciplines (October 2007).
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marginalized women as well as in their alienated communities: partnering with an
already accepted and functional organization, whether it is educational, medical, or
economic in its mission.
That modest conclusion was enough to identify the common needs of east African
communities, all of which pointed to schools, existing but struggling development
projects, and medical necessities. Certainly schools have other needs as well. Programs
such as the TIYY require more than stated, such as perhaps a building to house the
project. Orphanages and medical programs might profit from more than access to
medications. But identifying those will involve more than what even their established
primary needs demand: time in Africa to reveal them fully, and the development of a
viable way to fulfill them without disruptive unintended consequences.
Unintended consequences alone would mandate return to a designated venue
before attempting to implement any program aimed at distribution of vitamins or
anti-parasitical agents, for instance. As an extreme example of such consequences, surely
the UNHCR did not envision the possibility that women would be subjected to the
exchange of sexual favors for food when they designated certain refugee men to
distribute rations at Kakuma. Certainly, not all unintended consequences are so directly
discernable. But, just as the benefits of educating women can be undermined by
rendering them more attractive to suitors as wives because they yield more bride wealth,
there might be a corruption of intent if the items dispensed had greater value on some
black market than immediate benefits to the children for which they were intended.
Perhaps The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief frames the wording best;

22
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“To do nothing is better than to do something badly.”

That alone dictates the next step in organizing my proposed NGO. I must return
to Africa to revisit the best potential institution with which my organization will
collaborate. Its internal administrative, social and economic workings must be carefully
examined. The mechanics and dimensions of the relationship between the partners must
be carefully considered and closely defined. Instruments of mutual accountability have
to be established. If this project entails the distribution of supplements and
anti-parasitical agents using students as the distributors, the eligible cohort including
marginalized girls and other students must be defined. Further, elements of oversight
must be included, as well as close criteria of eligibility for the items to be dispensed.
The economic impact of the program has to be gauged. Community approval of the
program has to be earned and ensured. There must be vehicles ensuring the proper
delivery of the items. Sustainability of the program must be assured to be to the benefit
of the school, the students involved and the community as best possible. Proper training
for the student aids must take place. Other relevant issues will surely arise in an ordered
site study as the complexities of the relationship among the displaced, their host
communities, and the target school reveal themselves. All possible complicating factors
have to be addressed, and every knowable contingent issue must be resolved before the
organization, its mission and the means of accomplishing it are implemented.
Just as, ultimately, all politics are local, so are all community needs in
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post-conflict venues. The very foundations of society must, in some fashion, be
relayed. Economic stability must be achieved in order for self-sufficiency and civil order
to flourish. But the needs of African villagers are many and complex. What is clear is
that these needs must be met in accordance with the parameters of local culture and its
socioeconomic institutions. Development projects aimed at fulfilling local needs, no
matter what their nature, have had some degree of success in the past in stable
environments. The establishment of schools as a consequence of local initiative has
already laid the foundations for a more hopeful future based on community support in
South Sudan. But the needs of the re-emerging communities are many, if holistically
expressed. A better future also entails public health issues. Maternal, infant and child
mortality rates due to environmental perils are also an issue, as is the need to develop
economic infrastructure, whatever its character. To tackle these separately can put them
at cross-purposes. It is the opinion of this writer that needs are best met through
collaborative efforts. The building of schools, for instance, given the proper
environment, can stimulate locally based industry. Schools and health services, if
separately addressed, nonetheless express themselves together in healthy or unhealthy
children. Hence, the premise of collaboration as the basis of the delivery of these
services as a joint effort holds promise. It is the intention of this project to somehow
partner with a school in the effort to engineer not only a mutual connection with a
community, but to predispose at least a partial reintegration of displaced female children,
and hopefully their mothers.
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Some of the African challenges before such an effort have been identified, and
surely more will arise. That is not to ignore the stateside challenges and opportunities.
Some opportunities have already presented themselves and materialized. A seemingly
inexhaustible supply of inexpensive drugs, food supplements and other medical supplies
has been identified through a local NGO which stands ready to collaborate on the
acquisition and delivery of such products to African venues. Preliminary considerations
for the formal establishment of an NGO have been entertained. In the interest of creating
a sustainable base of funding for such an organization, a specialist in fundraising has
been consulted. The efforts surrounding these considerations are yet in their incipient
stages, but will need to be addressed squarely in the future. What is clear is that in the
order of considerations, most of the questions arising from them are premature. The first
order of business is to create a coherent program and a well-defined mission. That will
not be possible until the groundwork on the African continent is complete, and perhaps
even in its early stages of implementation. More remote yet are staffing issues. The
scope and scale of the development project must first be identified. To attempt that at
this juncture would be not only naïve, but ineffectual.
At the outset of this project, its purpose seemed clear and well defined. It seemed
focused and seemed to address a fairly straightforward need: the empowerment of women
in Sudan who had been marginalized by the communities to which they belonged because
they had been raped in the chaos of twenty years of war between northern and southern
Sudan. Given that other such women had succeeded in at least reintegrating into their
communities economically with external assistance they found various ways of sustaining
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themselves and their children, it seemed a realizable goal. But the dimensions and the
scale of destruction wrought by unrelenting conflict in southern Sudan created untold
numbers of internally displaced people within southern Sudan and hundreds of thousands
who fled to refugee camps in surrounding nation-states.
At the advice of my graduate committee, all of whom agreed that any effort to
start an NGO should begin with an assessment of the local circumstance in a chosen area,
I decided to visit Kenya with its two large camps, Kakuma and Dadaab. They agreed that
it seemed logical to focus on Kakuma, a camp first established for the “lost boys” who
had first marched to Ethiopia and then Kenya seeking refuge. What I found there was
deplorable. At first blush, it seemed that the UNHCR grossly mismanaged the camp,
confirming what I had heard in rather polemical conversations. I determined to explore
the evolution of UNHCR in an effort to understand how it was that there was such
violence, such hostility, such grinding poverty and hunger in an internationally supported
refugee facility. My initially harsh judgments of the UNHCR’s poor performance were
somewhat tempered as I came to understand the many constraints and conditions under
which they worked in Kenya. The UNHCR is burdened not only by the margins of its
mission, but by the realities of its host’s policies, as well as the fact that the camp itself
came to house refugees of multiple ethnicities from surrounding nation-states and was
located in the territory of the Turkana who have complete access to the camp. Further,
Dinka housed at Kakuma were accessible to the SPLA, who came to claim taxes, bribes,
military recruits and conscripts at will. And the UNHCR had neither the resources nor
the authority to intervene.
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In order to comprehend the nature of the dilemma, an understanding of the
situation in Sudan was required. Much of that was accomplished through the Rift Valley
Institute Course and the information I gained from locals in that town. The rest of the
second phase of the project entailed fleshing out the Sudanese context which generated
the lost boys and subsequent Dinka refugees who were to spend years at Kakuma as the
latest twenty year conflict in southern Sudan dragged on. That required familiarity with
the religious, cultural, political and economic roots of Sudan.
The next year was spent studying and researching Sudan to prepare myself to be
an informed participant in the next Rift Valley Course at Rumbek, Sudan. Clearly neither
academic learning nor on-site study alone could prepare me sufficiently to address the
formation of an NGO to help displaced women and their children. I needed both. Out of
this second phase of my study came the realization that in order to help women, I would
have to engage the communities into which they sought re-entry as well. Additionally, I
would have to explore the circumstances at Kakuma.
A second visit to that Kenyan camp was no more productive than the first.
It became absolutely clear that to work there was impossible. I would have to work in a
stable post-conflict venue. But in order to work with the repatriated men and women, it
was necessary to study the camp in which they had endured life for so many years before
returning to South Sudan.
The three preceding chapters were meant to help others who might undertake to
create a relief or development organization, either in Sudan or another nation-state in
Africa. Its conclusions are modest and not far removed from its original premise: that
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one must, to have any chance of success not only study whatever literature is
available concerning both the founding of NGOs, but physically engage the site where a
project might be launched. This research has been focused on how to start, rather than
proposing a specific start. Hopefully the “bookwork” is complete, at least for the
moment. The next step is to apply it to Africa. To accomplish that, a new trip there to
explore the possibilities at the most promising of the sites noted above is necessary.
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